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ABSTRACT
Leary and Downs (1995) have recently proposed the sociometer hypothesis, in which
they contend that self-esteem acts as a mental meter that serves the adaptive purpose of
monitoring one’s degree of exclusion from social groups. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999),
however, have proposed that different interpersonal relationships would have posed
different adaptive problems. Based upon evolutionary theory, they hypothesize that self
esteem is more likely to be domain-specific, and that multiple sociometers should
therefore exist to monitor different types of relationships.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis propose that previous research on self-esteem may be further
expanded by utilizing their multiple-sociometer model. One example of such research is
illustrated by Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) Study 1, in which they examine SelfEvaluation Maintenance (SEM). They conclude that affirmation, the recollection o f an
affinity for a personal interest, in any one highly self-relevant domain can offset a self
esteem injury in any other domain.
The current experiment adapted the design of this study to test the domain-specific self
esteem hypothesis. Specifically, it was hypothesized that an affirmation in the domain of
mate-selection would differentially affect self-esteem as compared to an affirmation in a
non-mate-selection domain, the coalitional domain.
All participants were male introductory psychology students, and ranged in age from 18
to 22 years. Two participants participated for each experimental session; each supplied
personal information via questionnaires and oral responses. Participants were led to
believe that a third, female participant would use their information to decide with whom
(of the two participants) she would participate later in the experiment. This third
participant was fictional. All participants were informed that they were not chosen. Prior
to receiving this information, participants affirmed in the domain of mate-selection,
affirmed in the domain of coalitional relationships, affirmed in both of these domains, or
affirmed in neither of these domains. After receiving the rejecting information, self
esteem and self-concept clarity was assessed.
The results of the current experiment did not significantly demonstrate that the nature o f
the affirmation differentially affected self-esteem. Trends in the results did, however,
support this differential effect. These nonsignificant results may reflect flaws in the
specific hypotheses, or may be due to a number of potential problems with the current
experiment.

DOMAIN-SPECIFICITY OF SELF-ESTEEM:
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

INTRODUCTION
Self-esteem, a topic of great interest to both academics and non-academics alike,
has been investigated from numerous perspectives by persons in many different fields.
Operational definitions for self-esteem seem to be as numerous as the papers that present
them, but most experimenters would agree that self-esteem entails some assessment of
one’s own self-worth, resulting from some combination o f cognitive and affective
components (Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995b;
O ’Connor, 1991; Ziller, Hagey, Smith, & Long, 1969). It is also well recognized that
negative affect is associated with what is referred to as low self-esteem, and that positive
affect is associated with what is known as high self-esteem. Low self-esteem is often
associated with feelings such as helplessness, inferiority, inadequacy, and depression,
whereas high self-esteem is often associated with feelings such as happiness, ambition,
and optimism (Leary, Schreindorfer, & Haupt, 1995a; O ’Connor, 1991).
A prevailing theme in much of the literature regarding self-esteem states or
implies that, when self-esteem is low, humans have some sort of inherent motivation
towards increasing it. In many cases, authors have claimed that this motivation to
increase low self-esteem could be considered to be a primary motivation with an
evolutionary basis (see O ’Connor, 1991 and Stevens & Fiske, 1995 for examples). Many
o f these theories that tie self-esteem to evolution, however, glaze over the relationship of
self-esteem with evolution and often amount to relatively simple asides in discussions of
other hypotheses regarding self-esteem. For example, O’Conner (1991), although
2
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positing the relationship between thinking and feeling, mentions that he hypothesizes
that self-esteem has an evolutionary basis because understanding reality is adaptive, and
understanding reality leads to self-esteem. This is the extent to which O ’Conner delves
into the relationship between evolution and self-esteem; he does not fully explain in what
way understanding reality was an adaptive problem nor does he fully explain how
understanding reality is adaptively connected to self-esteem.
Barkow (1977, 1989), however, has presented a more thorough argument for an
evolutionary basis o f self-esteem; he hypothesizes that self-esteem is homologous to
mechanisms relied upon in primate social dominance. Based upon information from non
human primates, Barkow suggests that human self-esteem is a mechanism by which to
gauge one’s place in a social hierarchy. He hypothesizes that self-esteem often functions
at a non-conscious level, and that this method o f dominance reasoning represents a highly
evolved system that is not as costly as more explicit methods o f social hierarchy
determination (Barkow, 1977, 1989).
The Sociometer Model
Building upon this evolutionary approach, and in response to what they think to
be a general lack of effort to illuminate the purpose of self-esteem, Leary and Downs
(1995) have proposed the sociometer hypothesis. They claim that self-esteem functions as
a mental meter that monitors one’s degree of perceived social inclusion and exclusion. In
particular, Leary and Downs hypothesize that this sociometer is sensitive to
environmental stimuli that are indicative of decreased levels of social inclusion, such as
rejection and decreased social affiliation. When increased levels o f such stimuli are
identified by one’s sociometer, one becomes motivated to increase social inclusion to a
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more optimal level. They theorize that this motivation is stimulated in a manner similar
to that involved in other known biological drive systems (e.g. hunger, thirst, danger), in
which affect serves as a motivator.
Leary and Downs’s (1995) hypothesis, therefore, takes the focus from self-esteem
as the entity that one is motivated to increase (when it is low), and places it upon social
inclusion. Leary et al. (1995b) have described this perspective change in terms o f a car’s
fuel gauge. They reason that, if an alien were not familiar with the purposes o f driving a
car, it could be reasonable for that alien to conclude that the goal of driving a car was to
keep the fuel gauge away from the letter “E” (this would be analogous to the typical
perspective that one possesses an extant motivation to avoid low self-esteem). Contrary
to this perspective, however, a car’s fuel gauge is actually a monitor that keeps one from
running out of gas (Leary et al., 1995b). Leary and Downs propose, by using the car’s gas
as a metaphor for social inclusion, that self-esteem serves the adaptive purpose of
monitoring one’s degree o f social inclusion, thereby helping one to avoid social exclusion
(an empty tank o f gas).
In support o f this hypothesis, Leary et al. (1995b) cite research suggesting that,
over evolutionary time, people were more likely to survive if they were part of a social
group. Leary et al. suggest, therefore, that the sociometer evolved as a means by which to
afford one the ability to maintain some perception of a minimum degree of social
inclusion. Hence, due to the increased survivability afforded by increased social
inclusion, Leary et al. hypothesize that it was adaptive for one to have the ability to
monitor one’s degree of social inclusion in order to avoid exclusion.
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To empirically examine the sociometer hypothesis, Leary et al. (1995b) began
by testing the fundamental assumption that self-esteem is related to perceived social
inclusion/exclusion. A series of five studies was conducted to test this assumption. The
series began with two correlational studies. The first study involved presenting
participants with hypothetical behaviors that varied in social desirability. Participants
then responded how they thought others would react to them if they had performed each
of the hypothetical behaviors. In the second study, participants wrote a paragraph about
%

the last time they had experienced one o f four negative emotions (associated with
exclusion) or one of four positive emotions (associated with inclusion). Leary et al.
hypothesized that writing about these emotions would prompt participants to write about
social inclusion/exclusion situations. Participants then rated how included/excluded they
felt when they experienced the emotion about which they wrote. Both studies also used a
scale to measure how the participants felt about themselves, either in the hypothetical
situation (Study 1) or in the real situation (Study 2). In both studies, Leary et al. found a
significant relationship between perceived inclusion/exclusion and how the participants
felt about themselves. In particular, the more excluded the participants felt, the more
likely it was that negative self-feelings were experienced; the more included the
participants felt, the more likely it was that positive self-feelings were experienced.
In order to investigate the causal relationship between inclusion/exclusion and
self-feelings, Leary et al. (1995b) also conducted two experiments. In both of these
experiments, inclusion/exclusion was manipulated. In the first o f these experiments,
Study 3, participants were informed that they were either included in or excluded from a
decision-making group on the basis of either other potential group members’ opinions of
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the participant, based upon information provided by the participant, or random selection.
All participants were actually randomly placed into experimental conditions. In Study 4,
the second of these experiments, participants received inclusionary or exclusionary
feedback (a third group was given no feedback) that was perceived by the participants to
have been based upon a verbal presentation of personal information to an unseen person
o f the opposite sex. This verbal presentation was made using an intercom system. For this
study, the intercom system was functional, and the person who was listening to the
participant provided responses via the intercom system. The type o f feedback that
participants received, however, was actually based upon random selection, and did not
depend upon the judgement of the third party that was listening to the participants’ oral
responses. In both of these experiments, self-feelings were assessed after the
manipulation. Results of both experiments indicated that negative self-feelings occurred
as a result of exclusion, and positive self-feelings occurred as a result of inclusion.
Leary, Haupt, Strausser, and Chokel (1998) recently modified the design of Leary
et al.’s (1995b) Study 4 in an experiment that used additional deception. In their
Experiment 4, Leary et al. (1998) had participants provide self-referent information into a
microphone. Unlike their previous study, however, the participants were only led to
believe that another person was listening to their responses. Actually, there was no other
person listening. Similar to Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4, participants were randomly
selected to receive feedback that ranged from most rejecting to most accepting.
Participants were, however, again led to believe that the feedback that they received was
based upon the responses that they had provided.
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For the first four of their studies, Leary et al. (1995b) assessed participants’ self
feelings. They claim that the self-feelings that participants reported in these studies
represented the participants’ state self-esteem. Leary et al. interpret state self-esteem as
the self-feelings that one is presently experiencing. Because state self-esteem is
representative of one’s current self-feelings, they assume that state self-esteem therefore
fluctuates, dependent upon the particular situations in which one is currently involved. In
the fifth study conducted by Leary et al., however, they examined what they purport to be
trait self-esteem. As they define it, trait self-esteem represents “some average level of
self-esteem over situations and time” (Leary et al., 1995b, p. 519). Again referring to
their fuel gauge metaphor, Leary et al. think that one’s trait self-esteem would represent
the average spot at which the gauge’s “indicator needle” points. Regarding
inclusion/exclusion from social groups, they feel that trait self-esteem represents one’s
estimation of inclusionary status when stimuli indicative of this status are not currently
available or present.
In their Study 5, Leary et al. (1995b) hoped to show that individual differences in
trait self-esteem were related to individual differences in perceived feelings o f general
inclusion/exclusion. Participants completed a scale designed to measure perceived
inclusionary status and two measures of general self-esteem. A negative correlation was
found between perceived exclusionary status and two measures o f self-esteem; as
perceived exclusionary status increased, self-esteem decreased. The results of Leary et
al.’s five studies, therefore, support the fundamental assumption o f Leary and Downs’s
sociometer hypothesis that self-esteem is related to perceived social inclusion/exclusion.
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A Proposed Extension o f the Sociometer Model
In light of these findings, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) suggest in a forthcoming
chapter that, although the sociometer hypothesis presents a promising approach to the
derivation of the purpose of self-esteem, Leary and Downs’s (1995) apparent assumption
that self-esteem is a singular sociometer, which is sensitive to all types of social
inclusion, is questionable. Basing their argument upon evolutionary theory, Kirkpatrick
and Ellis propose that, if the creation of a sociometer was the evolutionary response to the
adaptive problem o f identifying social exclusion, it would not have been adaptive for
humans to have evolved a single sociometer that was sensitive to social exclusion from
all types o f interpersonal relationships.
Evolutionary Theory
The modem evolutionary theory upon which Kirkpatrick and Ellis base their
argument predicts that the human mind is composed o f specific, species-universal,
cognitive processes termed psychological mechanisms (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Evolutionary psychologists postulate that each psychological mechanism represents the
evolved solution to a specific adaptive problem that was faced over evolutionary time. In
particular, these psychological mechanisms evolved because those who possessed them
were better suited for both personal survival and the survival of their genetic information,
whether by way of their own reproduction or the subsequent survival and reproduction of
their kin (Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Trivers, 1985).
Those who had these evolutionary processes were better suited to survival and
reproduction due to the dual role of psychological mechanisms. To begin with,
psychological mechanisms act as information-processing devices that function to
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discriminate certain input in order to specify the particular problem one is facing (Tooby
& Cosmides, 1992). In other words, a psychological mechanism first serves to afford the
identification o f a specific problem by way o f the characteristics that are specific to it.
Once a specific problem is identified, these mechanisms then act as decision rules that
transform the processed information into output that either regulates physiological
activity or produces action, in an attempt to solve the particular problem (Buss, 1995).
These mechanisms are therefore content-specific; each has evolved to be sensitive to and
solve specific problems encountered over evolutionary time. Research to date has
suggested that psychological mechanisms exist that solve specific problems such as those
relating to landscape preference, cheater detection, and mate selection, to name just a few
(c.f. Buss, 1995; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). Evolutionary
theory thus suggests that, due to the many different adaptive problems that must have
been encountered over evolutionary time, many such specific psychological mechanisms
must exist.
Self-Esteem and Domain-Specificitv
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) hypothesize that, from this evolutionary perspective,
different types of interpersonal relationships would have posed different adaptive
problems. Some o f these may have been such specific problems as: establishing and
maintaining coalitional relationships with same-sex members, avoiding potential fights
with same-sex competitors, and selecting, attracting, and retaining desirable mates.
Because they hypothesize that each type o f interpersonal relationship posed its own
specific adaptive problems, and that each problem would therefore be represented by
specific, distinguishing stimuli, Kirkpatrick and Ellis propose that specific sociometers
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should exist to monitor the adaptive problems associated with each type of specific
relationship. Kirkpatrick and Ellis therefore hypothesize that self-esteem is “domainspecific.” They further conclude that Leary and Downs (1995), by hypothesizing that
self-esteem acts as a sociometer that is sensitive to generalized information regarding
social exclusion, do not address the existence of multiple domains of self-esteem and
therefore the possible existence of multiple sociometers. (Both Leary and Downs and
Kirkpatrick and Ellis, although positing the association between self-esteem and
interpersonal relationships, do not assume that self-esteem can only be affected via social
information. Previous researchers, such as Bandura, 1977, have suggested that selfefficacy [self-esteem] can be affected by an intrinsic realization of one’s ability for
specific behaviors. Such alternative means by which to affect self-esteem, however, will
not be addressed in the current discussion.)
The concept of “domain-specific” or “specific” self-esteem, however, is not new
to the self-esteem literature. Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, and Rosenberg (1995),
for example, have defined self-esteem as an attitude towards oneself, and feel that
specific self-esteem is a specific attitude towards a specific facet of oneself. Rosenberg et
al. base this conceptualization in part upon research that was conducted, using the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, that discovered two independent factors, called selfconfidence and self-deprecation. Due to the loading on these two factors, it was
concluded that these they must represent two separate components of self-esteem.
Building upon these conclusions, Rosenberg et al. (1995) have recently
hypothesized that specific self-esteem is related to one’s specific, corresponding
behaviors, whereas global self-esteem is related to one’s overall well-being. They
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therefore state, in a manner similar to Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), that they would not
expect global self-esteem to evidence much about one’s perceived efficacy in a specific
behavior, but would expect specific self-esteem to be a better predictor of that specific
behavior. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis, Rosenberg et al. have examined what
they have operationalized as “academic self-esteem” as one variant of specific self
esteem. To do so, they used Bachman’s School Ability Self-Concept Index as an
assessment of academic self-esteem. In support of their hypothesis, they found academic
self-esteem to be more highly correlated to school performance than global self-esteem
(as assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Rosenberg, et al., 1995). Due to these
findings, further data collection has led Rosenberg et al. to conclude, again in a similar
manner to that of Kirkpatrick and Ellis, that, in order to affect school performance, one
must affect academic self-esteem and not global self-esteem.
Rosenberg et al. (1995) also based their specific self-esteem hypotheses upon
research completed by Marsh, who has done a significant amount of work on specific
aspects o f the self-concept (c.f. Marsh, 1986; Marsh & O ’Neill, 1984). In particular,
Marsh and O ’Neill (1984) discovered specific facets of the self-concept that were of
“remarkable clarity” when factor-analyzing their Self Description Questionnaire III (SDQ
III), which had been created to assess the self-concepts o f late adolescents. This factor
analysis revealed thirteen factors of the self-concept, including factors such as:
Mathematics, Verbal, Academic, and Physical Abilities/Sports (Marsh & O ’Neill, 1984).
Marsh and O’Neill hypothesize that each of these thirteen factors are distinct dimensions
o f the self-concept, in contrast to the General-Self factor, which they define as that
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assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Marsh and O ’Neill, therefore, would
hypothesize that each o f these factors represents a specific facet of self-esteem.
Another example of work that has defined what has been operationalized as
specific domains of self-esteem has been completed by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992).
Unlike Rosenberg et al. and Marsh, however, the research conducted by Luhtanen and
Crocker does not focus upon specific behaviors as the origins of specific self-esteem, but
upon facets of what they term collective self-esteem. In particular, collective self-esteem
is operationalized by Luhtanen and Crocker (1992, p. 303) to

..denote those aspects of

identity that have to do with memberships in social groups and the value placed on one’s
social groups, respectively.” In an attempt to create a measure to assess collective self
esteem, Luhtanen and Crocker created a scale, the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES).
Upon factor-analysis of the CSES, they identified what they believe to be different
factors of collective self-esteem: 1) Membership, the degree to which one believes that
one is a worthy member of one’s social groups, 2) Private, one’s personal beliefs of how
good one’s social groups are, 3) Public, one’s beliefs of how other people view one’s
social groups, and 4) Identity, the importance of one’s social groups to one’s selfconcept. Luhtanen and Crocker, therefore, also posit the existence o f specific facets of
self-esteem.
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) acknowledge the existence of different hypotheses of
specific self-esteem, and agree that self-esteem can be factor analyzed from a number of
different perspectives in order to demonstrate these different facets. However,
Kirkpatrick and Ellis stress that discovering specific facets o f self-esteem by this manner
is a purely descriptive exercise. That is, these factors are determined on an arbitrary basis,
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such as factor analysis. They further argue that an evolutionary approach, on the other
hand, offers a non-arbitrary, functional manner by which to differentiate self-esteem.
Cooperative relationships. Even though they hypothesize that it is more likely that
self-esteem is domain-specific, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) admit that not enough data
have been collected to determine how many domain-specific sociometers one possesses
or their individual level o f specificity. They do, however, suggest that domains of self
esteem may fall into two broad categories: those dealing with “cooperative” relationships
and those dealing with “competitive” relationships (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Although
they would hypothesize that the individual domains of self-esteem included in either of
these categories represent solutions to specific adaptive problems, they nonetheless
conclude that the domains in one o f these categories represent evolved solutions to
adaptive problems that were fundamentally different from those that were solved by the
domains of self-esteem included in the other category.
To begin with, they hypothesize that cooperative sociometers function in a
manner similar to that hypothesized by Leary and Downs (1995), insomuch that they help
one to assess degree o f perceived exclusion from types of cooperative relationships, such
as those involved in social exchange, coalitions and alliances, and friendships
(Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Utilizing work such as that conducted by Luhtanen and
Crocker (1992), they expand upon Leary and Downs’s perspective, however, and
hypothesize that these sociometers may also function to assess both the quality o f one’s
social group and the quality of one’s personal contribution to that social group. By so
hypothesizing, Kirkpatrick and Ellis suggest that low self-esteem does not simply
motivate one to avoid exclusion, but that it may serve to motivate one to take more
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specific action, such as strengthening one’s own group, switching alliances, or joining
a new group, each depending upon the specific situation.
Competitive relationships. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) presume that the
information to which a competitive sociometer would be sensitive is fundamentally
different from that which is indicative of more cooperative relationships. This
presumption is based upon hypotheses regarding the relationship between self-esteem and
a self-concept known in the animal-behavior literature as resource-holding potential
(RHP; Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995). RHP is considered to be an evolved system that
allows one to assess the likelihood that one can either defend one’s own resources from
competitors or challenge the resources o f others. (Although it is not always explicitly
stated, it is implied that there are sex differences with regard to RHP. In particular, the
literature implies that RHP is a system that is primarily possessed and utilized by males.)
Therefore, when competing individuals come in contact with each other, one can
potentially determine one’s RHP as being lower than, higher than, or the same as that
possessed by those others. This is accomplished by comparatively assessing stimuli that
are indicative of fighting ability and dominance, such as size and apparent strength. For
individuals who perceive their RHP as either higher or lower than that o f competitors,
this system allows one to affect the outcome of a competitive interaction without physical
contact. If one perceives one’s RHP as lower than that of others, that individual backs off
or otherwise submits; if one perceives one’s RHP as higher than that of others, that
individual attacks or employs some other dominant action. If competitive individuals
determine, however, that their respective RHP’s are essentially equal, a fight or direct
competition ensues, after which the loser’s RHP decreases and the winner’s RHP
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increases. Research has suggested, therefore, that natural selection favored those
individuals who were more often able to determine their comparative value without
incurring the excessive costs associated with direct, physical combat (see Dawkins, 1989
for a thorough discussion of this phenomenon).
Researchers who have investigated RHP hypothesize that, for humans, RHP may
represent the evolutionary foundations of self-esteem (Gilbert et al., 1995). They base
this hypothesis upon research that has suggested that self-esteem in part functions in a
manner similar to that o f RHP, in that it often helps one to determine the degree to which
one will either be able to defend one’s resources or challenge the resources of others
(Gilbert et al., 1995). This perspective is in many ways similar to the previously
discussed perspective that has been posited by Barkow (1977, 1989). In particular, an
assessment of comparative value that results in action that indicates that one is either of
lower, higher, or similar RHP as a competitor might subsequently allow one to gauge
one’s respective place in a social hierarchy.
Based upon these conclusions regarding RHP, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999)
hypothesize that competitive sociometers would be sensitive to socially comparative
information, thereby allowing one to assess how one stacks up to others in competitive
domains. Having access to this information would allow one to assess one’s relative
value, and would serve the adaptive purpose of guiding appropriate behavior, based upon
that assessment. That appropriate behavior, however, would vary, dependent upon the
information that is provided by the appropriate competitive sociometer. If one’s
competitive sociometer provides one with information that leads one to perceive that one
is o f lower competitive value (low self-esteem), the appropriate behavior would most
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likely be to take some sort of submissive action. On the other hand, if one’s
competitive sociometer provides one with information that leads one to perceive that one
is of higher competitive value (high self-esteem), the appropriate behavior would most
likely be to take some sort of aggressive or dominant action. A more competitively
orientated sociometer, therefore, would function to both monitor external stimuli
indicative of competitions and subsequently motivate one to select a strategy or prefer a
specific behavior that is most appropriate, given one’s perceived relative competitive
value (Dawkins, 1989; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999).
Mate-selection: A competitive domain. To further illustrate their hypotheses,
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) use the paradigm o f mate-selection to represent what they
assume to be an example of an “inherently competitive” domain. They first discuss the
topic o f mate-value. a term that they adopted to describe a concept outlined by Kenrick,
Groth, Trost, and Sadalla (1993). Kenrick et al. (1993) have proposed that mate-selection
is a variant o f social exchange, in which persons of each sex look for the best value in an
opposite-sex mate. In order to find the best value, they hypothesize that people assess the
mate-selection “market value” of other people o f the opposite sex (Kenrick et al., 1993).
They further propose that, if everyone were motivated to find someone of the best matevalue, people would tend to pair up with opposite sex others with similar mate-value, in a
sense exchanging their mate-value with that person.
Despite the parallels between mate-selection and social exchange paradigms,
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) stress that mate-selection is ultimately a zero-sum contest,
where one person’s success is another’s failure. With this in mind, they propose that
mate-value is an assessment of one’s mate-selection market value relative to the mate-
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selection market value of other potential same-sex competitors. A mate-selection
competitive sociometer, therefore, allows one to assess one’s own mate-value by
attending to specific information, such as mate-selection social feedback, success and
failure in mating situations, and current mating status and mating satisfaction
(Kirkpatrick and Ellis, 1999). Once this assessment is made, they hypothesize that one’s
perceived mate-value will serve to guide one in mating-partner preferences and also help
one to choose appropriate mating strategies.
This perspective o f self-esteem aiding one in determining one’s mate-value and
subsequently guiding appropriate behavior is shared by Wright (1994). Specifically,
Wright concludes that people use their self-esteem to determine appropriate mating
behaviors. He posits that, for example, males with high self-esteem are more likely to
choose a mating strategy in which they seek more “short-term conquests” (i.e. short-term,
predominantly sexual relationships with females). He bases this postulation on the
conclusion that males with high self-esteem are more likely to be good-looking and/or
possess high-status, and that such short-term conquests (and therefore more females) will
be more accessible to such males. In contrast, however, he hypothesizes that males with
very low self-esteem may adopt a different mating strategy, which may include rape.
Wright comments that rape is known to be present in many cultures, and often occurs
because a male can not obtain a mate by more “legitimate” means.
Previous research has suggested that humans determine mate-value by assessing
traits for which they have an evolved preference. For example, past researchers who have
studied mate-selection have observed that a number o f different male characteristics
appear to be sexually attractive to females (c.f. Buss, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994; Kenrick et
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al., 1993). It has been suggested that the male characteristics that females find sexually
attractive are primarily related to three general roles that males play in reproduction:
those dealing with provision, protection, and parenting (Ellis, 1992). It is further
theorized that males took upon these reproductive roles in order to solve applicable
adaptive problems that arose in our evolutionary past. Researchers suggest, therefore, that
females who favored characteristics in their mates that were indices o f increased ability
to effectively accomplish these roles were more likely to survive and produce and raise
viable offspring (who themselves successfully reproduce; Buss, 1992, 1994; Ellis, 1992).
Mate-selection research that has adopted this evolutionary perspective has
suggested types o f traits that females both should have and do find sexually attractive in
males. To begin with, it has been suggested that one o f the most important male mateselection characteristics deals with resource possession (Buss, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1994).
Buss (1992) hypothesizes that resource possession is one of the most important male
mate-selection characteristics because of the inherent benefits females gain from
increased access to resources, for both themselves and their offspring. In particular,
increased access to resources affords immediate survival benefits to both mate and
offspring and increases future survivability both directly (resources explicitly available)
and indirectly (offspring may inherit the traits that led the father to have increased
resource possession).
Buss (1992, 1994) also notes, however, that resources take time to acquire, and
females often must choose a mate that is too young to have yet amassed significant
resources. His data suggest that females overcome this obstacle by assessing a possible
mate’s resource potential. Given that potential is not something that can be directly
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observed, however, it is not obvious how females make this assessment. In response, it
has been suggested that one’s resource potential can be represented by indicators such as
ambitiousness and hard work (Buss, 1992, 1994; Ellis, 1992). For example, studying
traits that might predict past and current success in the workplace, Buss (1994) found that
hard work was the best predictor of income and promotions. It has also been suggested
that intelligence is a good predictor of future resource possession (Buss, 1992).
In addition to those traits dealing with resource possession or resource potential, it
has also been suggested that a male’s physical prowess is a highly attractive mateselection characteristic. In particular, a male that was physically dominant had a greater
likelihood of prevailing over others of the same sex, so as to both protect resources that
were possessed and also acquire the resources of others (Buss, 1988; Ellis, 1992). Such
males also had a greater likelihood of providing sufficient protection, from same sex
competitors, for both mate and offspring (Buss, 1994). Buss (1994) has suggested that a
male’s physical prowess is often displayed through feats of athletic ability.
When given a choice among potentially attractive male characteristics, females
often choose those that deal with “love” and “kindness” as their most desired traits (Buss,
1992; Ellis, 1992). Buss (1992) has hypothesized that traits relating to these personal
characteristics may be indicative of the degree to which a male is willing to provide a
female with his resources. If this were true, however, he hypothesizes that generalized
kindness should not be as desirable as kindness that was specifically focused upon a
given female, indicating a male’s desire to solely impart resources to that female. Buss
admits, however, that not enough data have been collected to more fully support these
hypotheses.
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In addition to these male traits and characteristics, the literature suggests that
other male traits and characteristics are also found to be sexually attractive by females.
To begin with, physical attractiveness is an important indicator of physical health,
dominance, and resource possession. For example, it is suggested that females generally
prefer taller men to shorter men because height is in many ways an indicator of physical
dominance (Buss, 1992, 1994). In addition, because resources take time to acquire, older
males are more likely to have a greater amount of resources, and therefore male traits that
are indicative of “maturity” are often found by females to be more attractive (Buss, 1992;
Ellis, 1992; Kenrick et al., 1993). Third, dependability may be a further indication of
willingness to provide and protect (Buss, 1994). Indications of fidelity may also be
desirable, but, because a female’s maternity is never in question, this should only be
important when it is indicative of resource allocation (i.e. infidelity may be an indication
that resources are being directed elsewhere; Buss, 1992, 1994).
It has been suggested that, due to their reproductive and adaptive importance, all
of the traits that females find sexually attractive serve as important indicators of a male’s
mate-value (Ellis, 1992; Kenrick et al., 1993; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999). Because these
characteristics are indicative o f one’s value, each characteristic has the potential to be
perceived by others to fall anywhere on a continuum of desirability, ranging from highly
desirable to highly undesirable. Due to individual variability, however, it is likely that,
for any one male, each of these characteristics will not be perceived to be o f similar
desirability. For example, a male may be considered to be highly physically attractive,
but may possess little or no resources. Due to this variability, one can conceive of matevalue as being based upon the sum total of these individual characteristics.
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Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) hypothesize that it is possible that a sociometer
that monitors mate-selection information may primarily function during specific
circumstances that require one to determine one’s relative mate-value. In particular, one’s
mate-selection sociometer may be “turned on” when one is on the mating market (i.e.
does not currently have a mate or is otherwise looking for one), because one is actively
attempting to acquire a mate, a process that requires one to establish one’s relative matevalue. When one is in a dating or other long term mating relationship, however, one’s
mate-selection sociometer may be deactivated because one no longer has immediate need
to assess one’s comparative mate-value.
Building upon Leary and Downs’s sociometer hypothesis, and utilizing
evolutionary theory, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) propose hypotheses that may provide
more information regarding the purposes of self-esteem. Starting with the prediction that
self-esteem is more likely to be domain-specific, they have expanded previous ideas
regarding self-esteem and interpersonal interaction and have suggested that sociometers
function to both monitor social exclusion and provide one with comparative personal
value. Admittedly, however, little empirical work has been conducted to test these
hypotheses, and Kirkpatrick and Ellis therefore do not have a wealth of data to support
them. The current experiment is an attempt to take a small step toward rectifying this
situation. In particular, the current experiment compares a competitive and cooperative
domain o f self-esteem in an attempt to demonstrate the domain-specificity o f self-esteem.
Evidence for Domains of Self-Esteem
To demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem, one must first be able to
identify such domains. This is no small task, as Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) have
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indicated that neither the number nor degree of specificity of any domain is currently
known. As noted earlier, Kirkpatrick and Ellis have, however, suggested that domains of
self-esteem may fall into the general categories of those relating to cooperative and of
those relating to competitive relationships. In line with this hypothesis, I recently
collected data that suggest that, what I operationalize as coalitional (cooperative) and
mate-selection (competitive) self-esteem, may, to some degree, represent two distinct
domains of self-esteem (Williams, 1998; Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998, 1999).
Mate-Selection Self-Esteem
In a recent study, I created items that were hypothesized to be related to mateselection in order to construct a scale that assessed mate-selection self-esteem (Williams,
1998). In its original incarnation, this scale was composed of eight mate-selection-related
items. Each item was created so that participants could respond with the degree to which
they agreed with each item via a five-point Likert-type scale. One such item was: “I
sometimes wish I were more physically attractive.” Participants were presented with this
scale, in addition to other scales (such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the CSES)
and items that were hypothesized to be related to mate-selection self-esteem (such as
“What do you feel are the chances that one o f the most popular persons o f the opposite
sex on campus would ask you out?”).
Reliability. The results of this study suggested that the original, eight-item version
of the mate-selection self-esteem scale was internally consistent (a = .76; item-total
correlations ranging from .21 to .73; n = 78). Despite these findings, I created additional
items in order to attempt to increase this scale’s internal consistency.
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In an attempt to increase the internal consistency of the mate-selection self
esteem scale, twelve additional mate-selection related items were created. These new
items were similar to those that I originally created. One example of these new mateselection self-esteem items is: “I often worry about what people of the opposite sex think
about me.” As with the original mate-selection self-esteem items, these items were
created to elicit the degree to which one agreed with each item, using a five-point Likerttype response scale. These new items were evaluated in another study that I recently
conducted (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). For this study, participants were presented
with these new mate-selection self-esteem items along with the eight original mateselection self-esteem items. Once the data were collected, the new mate-selection self
esteem items were evaluated separate from and combined with the original eight items, in
addition to a separate evaluation of only the original eight items. The original eight items
were found to have an alpha of .70, the twelve new items were found to have an alpha of
.83, and all twenty of the mate-selection self-esteem items combined were found to have
an alpha o f .88 (the item-total correlations for all items ranged from .21 to .64, n = 101).
With the results of this most recent study, I decided to attempt to reduce the total
number of mate-selection self-esteem items without significantly affecting their internal
consistency. In order to do so, all of the items were sorted by item-total correlation. Once
these items were sorted in this manner, the twelve items with the highest item-total
correlations were separated from the rest (these items also had the lowest “alpha if
deleted” value). These twelve items were composed o f four o f the original mate-selection
self-esteem items and eight o f the new mate-selection self-esteem items. The item-total
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correlations for these twelve items ranged from .49 to .64, and the alpha if deleted
ranged from .88 to .87, respectively (recall that the alpha for all of the items was .88).
Once these items were separated, a separate reliability analysis was run on these
items. This analysis revealed that the twelve items were internally consistent, with an
overall alpha of .88 (recall that n = 101). Because the internal consistency of this mateselection self-esteem scale remained relatively the same even though eight items were
removed, I included these twelve items as a group in a recent mass-testing procedure (see
Appendix A for a list of all twelve o f these mate-selection self-esteem items; Williams &
Kirkpatrick, 1999). The analysis of the data collected from this procedure revealed that
the twelve mate-selection self-esteem items were again found to be internally consistent,
with an overall alpha o f .86 (item-total correlations ranged from .35 to .67, n = 455).
Validity. So as to assess the validity of the original, eight-item version of the
mate-selection self-esteem scale, correlation and regression analyses were conducted on
data that were recently collected (Williams, 1998). For example, correlational analyses
indicated that the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (i.e. global self-esteem), the mateselection self-esteem scale, and the coalitional self-esteem scale were all significantly
related to items that I had hypothesized would be related to mate-selection self-esteem.
Despite these significant correlations, regression analyses revealed that, in equations
containing all three self-esteem measures as independent variables, the mate-selection
self-esteem scale was the only significant predictor of these same items. These and other
similar results led me to conclude that this version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale
was a good measure o f mate-selection self-esteem (Williams, 1998).
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Similar results from data collected in another recent study led me to believe
that the twelve-item version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale was also a good
measure of mate-selection self-esteem (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). For example,
compared with the Rosenberg and coalitional self-esteem scales, the mate-selection self
esteem scale was the only scale that was significantly related to items concerning
participants’ dating status.
Coalitional Self-Esteem
Unlike the mate-selection self-esteem scale, which I created to assess a
competitive domain, the second domain-specific self-esteem scale was constructed to
assess a cooperative domain. In particular, this scale was constructed to assess coalitional
self-esteem. This scale is composed of eight items that were hypothesized to be related to
coalitional self-esteem. One such item that was used was: “My partners on group projects
believe that I have much to offer” (see Appendix B for a comprehensive list of all
coalitional self-esteem items). As with the mate-selection self-esteem scale, I created the
items in this scale to assess the degree to which one agreed with each item, using a fivepoint Likert-type response scale. This scale was also recently included in a recent study,
along with other scales (such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the CSES) and
items that were hypothesized to be related to coalitional self-esteem (such as “Whenever
I work as part of a group for a class, it seems as if my opinions are often ignored.”;
Williams, 1998).
Reliability and validity. The items in this scale were recently found to be
internally consistent (a = .83, item-total correlations ranging from .41 to .68, n = 78;
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Williams, 1998). These findings were again confirmed in another recent study (a =
.75, item-total correlations ranging from .29 to .64, n = 101; Williams & Kirkpatrick,
1998).
So as to assess the validity of the coalitional self-esteem scale, analyses were
conducted on the data collected in both of these previous studies. For example, results
from the first of these two studies indicated that, relative to the Rosenberg and mateselection self-esteem scales, the coalitional self-esteem scale was the only significant
predictor of an item that I thought would be related to coalitional self-esteem, whether
participants felt that they accomplished more when they worked alone (Williams, 1998).
Results o f the second o f these previous studies were similar to those o f the first. For
example, relative to the Rosenberg and mate-selection self-esteem scales, the coalitional
self-esteem scale was the only significant predictor of loneliness, a construct that I
thought would be related to coalitional self-esteem (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998).
These and other similar results led me to conclude that the coalitional self-esteem scale
was a valid measure of coalitional self-esteem.
Previous studies that I have conducted have suggested that mate-selection self
esteem (a competitive domain) and coalitional self-esteem (a cooperative domain) may
represent, to some degree, domains o f self-esteem. At the very least, these studies suggest
that coalitional and mate-selection self-esteem can be assessed both separately from each
other and from global self-esteem (i.e. the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale).
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Applications of the Domain-Specific Hypothesis
The Domain-Specific Hypothesis, as Applied to Previous Sociometer Research
Unlike their Study 3, participants in Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4 supplied
personal information to an individual who was of the opposite sex. Despite this
potentially interesting procedural addition, Leary et al. neither hypothesized nor found
data that suggested that participants were differently affected (compared to the results
from their Study 3, in which the third party was composed o f persons of the same sex as
the participant). This is not particularly surprising. As has been previously discussed,
Leary et al. imply that they hypothesize that one possesses a generalized sociometer that
is sensitive to generalized social exclusion information. In line with this hypothesis,
Leary et al. utilized a dependent measure in their Study 4 that assessed global selfevaluation (global self-esteem). It is very likely, therefore, that if perceived rejection by
someone o f the opposite sex (in their study) affected the participants’ mate-selection self
esteem, a measure designed to assess global self-esteem would not be sensitive enough to
thoroughly assess the effects.
An experiment was recently conducted, however, that replicated Leary et al.’s
(1995b) Study 4, in an attempt to address these issues. Glenn (1998) developed an
experimental design for his Study 2 that was similar to that of Leary et al.’s except for a
few modifications. To begin with, the perceived sex of the third party was manipulated;
half o f Glenn’s participants were given the perception that the third party was the same
sex (as them) and the other half of the participants were given the perception that the
third party was of the opposite sex. In addition to this procedural change, the dating status
o f the participants was also controlled so that half of the participants were in a
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heterosexual dating relationship and half were not. Finally, in addition to utilizing the
measure of global self-assessment that was employed by Leary et al., Glenn used the
eight-item version of the measure o f mate-selection self-esteem that I recently created
(Williams, 1998).
The procedure of Glenn’s (1998) Study 2 was similar to that of Leary et al.’s
(1995b) Study 4. At the beginning of the experimental session, participants were
informed that they would be interacting with another participant (there actually was no
other participant). Participants then completed a sheet requesting biographical
information, and received a biographical sheet that was purported to have been completed
by the person with whom they were to be interacting. The sheet that they received,
however, had been completed by the experimenter so as to give participants the
impression that the other participant was either the same or the opposite sex of the
participant. The gender that was portrayed on this sheet was selected randomly for each
participant. Participants then orally responded to the same self-referent questions used by
Leary et al. in their Study 4. Participants responded to these questions for five minutes
into a microphone; they were given the impression that the other participant was listening
to their responses in another room.
After the participants had orally responded for five minutes, they received a sheet
that was alleged to have been provided by the other participant. Participants were
informed that this sheet contained feedback that was based upon the participant’s oral
responses. This feedback ostensibly indicated the degree to which the other participant
either “liked, accepted, or wanted to interact with” (positive feedback) or “did not like,
accept, or want to interact with” (negative feedback) the participant (Glenn, 1998). This
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sheet was actually completed by the experimenter, and the nature of the feedback (i.e.
either positive or negative) that participants received was randomly determined. It was
hoped that these alterations to Leary et al.’s (1995b) design would be sufficient to
demonstrate the domain-specificity of mate-selection self-esteem by illustrating an
interaction between the type of feedback that participants received, the sex of the third
party, and the current dating status of the participant. Unfortunately, this interaction was
not found to be significant for any of the utilized dependent measures (the mate-selection
self-esteem scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the measure of global selfassessment that was used by Leary et al.).
It is possible that significant results were not found in Glenn’s (1998) experiment
because the perceived rejection by someone of the opposite sex did not significantly
affect the participants’ mate-selection self-esteem. Looking at this from the perspective
proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), it is possible that the information that was
indicative of the perceived rejection was not interpreted by the participants’ mateselection sociometers. This would lead one to hypothesize, therefore, that participants did
not interpret the perceived rejection as occurring in a mate-selection context, and may in
fact have been interpreted it in a different context. Specifically, due to the lack of a
competitive component in the perceived rejection, the rejection may have been
interpreted as occurring in a cooperative domain.
I believe that the design that Glenn (1998) utilized could be enhanced by more
fully applying the hypotheses recently posited by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999). In
particular, based upon their assumption that mate-selection is an inherently competitive
domain, Glenn’s design might benefit from an attempt to orchestrate the perceived
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rejection so that it will be more likely that participants will interpret the rejection in a
mate-selection context. This might be affected if the perceived rejection was placed in a
competitive paradigm, where participants would not only be rejected by someone of the
opposite sex, but would be rejected in lieu o f someone else who is the same sex as the
participant.
A Potential Application for the Domain-Specific Hypothesis
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) propose that previous research on self-esteem may be
further informed and expanded by utilizing their multiple-sociometer model. One such
line of inquiry that could benefit from this perspective is demonstrated by research,
conducted by Tesser and Cornell (1991), that examines a phenomenon known as SelfEvaluation Maintenance (SEM). In their Study 1, Tesser and Cornell examined the
effects o f a lost competition upon one’s global self-esteem. Given Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s
hypotheses about the possible existence of sociometers that monitor competitive
domains, this experiment represents a paradigm that might be expanded by adopting their
domain-specific perspective.
Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) design for their Study 1 entailed a perceived
competitive situation, in which the participants’ global self-esteem was adversely
affected by the perceived superior performance of either a friend or a stranger in either a
domain of high or low self-relevance (to the participant). Participants first completed a
task that was hypothesized to be of either high or low self-relevance. In the high self
relevance condition, the task was called a “Verbal Skills Task.” Participants were
informed that their performance on this task was positively correlated to intelligence and
scores on tests like the Graduate Record Exam (GRE). It was therefore hypothesized that
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participants would view their performance on this task as highly self-relevant. In the
low self-relevance condition, the task was referred to as a “Password” type of game (note
that the word game was used instead of task, in order to make it appear less important).
Participants were informed that the experimenters did not know o f anything with which
performance on the Password game was correlated, and that performance may in fact not
be related to anything at all. It was therefore hypothesized that participants would view
their performance on the Password game as being of low self-relevance.
Despite the different descriptors used for the high and low self-relevance
conditions, all participants actually completed the same task. Participants guessed an
unknown word based upon clues that were provided by the experimenters. Participants
were given four clues for each word and were given a total o f eight unknown words. All
participants, regardless of condition, were later informed that they were outperformed by
both a friend of theirs (who had accompanied them to the experiment) and a stranger.
Prior to the participants’ receipt of the information that someone else
outperformed them, another variable, which Tesser and Cornell (1991) call “affirmation,”
was manipulated. Affirmation, for their Study 1, is operationalized as offering a
participant an opportunity to recall superior performance in or affinity for a personal
interest domain. Experimentally, affirmation entailed the participant answering questions
that pertained to a domain that was of either high or low self-relevance.
In order to discover a domain o f high self-relevance for each participant, Tesser
and Cornell (1991) devised a procedure that utilized the dominant interests in personality
outlined in the Allport-Vemon “Study of Values” scale. To begin with, Tesser and
Cornell imply that they presented participants with descriptions o f each of the six
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Allport-Vemon categories of dominant interests at the onset of an experimental
session. For example, one such interest category is called “Theoretical” (Allport, Vemon,
& Lindzey, 1970). The category description that is offered for this category is:
The Theoretical. The dominant interest of the theoretical man is the discovery of
truth. In the pursuit of this goal he characteristically takes a ‘cognitive’ attitude,
one that divests itself of judgements regarding the beauty or utility of objects, and
seeks only to observe and to reason. Since the interests of the theoretical man are
empirical, critical, and rational, he is necessarily an intellectualist, frequently a
scientist or philosopher. His chief aim in life is to order and systematize his
knowledge (Allport et al., 1970, p. 4).
Once the participants had read all of the six category descriptions, they rated the
individual importance of each of the six and then rank-ordered all o f the categories by
importance. The category that each participant indicated to be the most important was
seen by Tesser and Cornell as an indication that that interest was highly self-relevant to
the participant. A ten-item subscale o f the interest category that was indicated by
participants to be the most important was later used in the study as the affirmation.
Tesser and Cornell (1991) found that when participants affirmed themselves in a
domain that was o f high self-relevance, their global self-esteem appeared to be less
adversely affected by the superior performance o f another. This was not found, however,
for those who affirmed themselves in a domain of low self-relevance. Based upon these
findings, Tesser and Cornell have concluded that an injury to global self-esteem can be
offset if one first affirms oneself in a domain that is of high self-relevance.
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Tesser and Cornell (1991), by making such a conclusion, suggest a
fundamental assumption regarding self-esteem. In particular, they suggest that any injury
to one’s self-esteem can be offset by an affirmation in any domain of high self-relevance.
According to the domain-specific hypothesis proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999),
however, this should not be the case. In particular, Kirkpatrick and Ellis would
hypothesize that an injury in one domain could only be offset by an affirmation in the
domain in which the injury occurred. For example, if one were to have one’s self-esteem
injured in the competitive domain of mate-selection, Kirkpatrick and Ellis would
hypothesize that affirmation in a domain such as the cooperative coalitional domain
should not offset the injury.
With Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (1999) hypotheses in mind, one might ask how, if
self-esteem is domain-specific, Tesser and Cornell (1991) could have found significant
results without accounting for domain-specificity. This question is most easily addressed
by first defining global self-esteem, the parameter investigated by Tesser and Cornell.
From a domain-specific perspective, global self-esteem can be envisioned as an overall
assessment of the current state o f all of one’s individual domains o f self-esteem (Even
though this is highly conceptual, and global self-esteem might, more accurately, be
assessing the overall current state of all active or currently salient domains of self-esteem
(a discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper), I feel that it is presently sufficient to
define global self-esteem as such). If one of the domains included in this overall
assessment is injured, global self-esteem should decrease accordingly. This decrease,
however, should not be to the same degree that would be seen if the injured domain could
be directly assessed, because global self-esteem is an overall assessment o f all domains of
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self-esteem, including those that were not injured (i.e. the negative effect of the injured
domain on global self-esteem is buffered by the domains that have not been injured). If
one were to have previously affirmed oneself in a domain that was different from that
which was injured, however, the injured domain should not be affected by the
affirmation, but self-esteem in the domain o f the affirmation should increase. In response
to the increase in self-esteem in the domain o f affirmation, one’s global self-esteem
should also increase; however, because the injured domain has not been affected by the
affirmation, global self-esteem should still reflect the effects o f the injured domain and
therefore not increase to the degree that would be seen if there had been no injury. This
might explain why Tesser and Cornell found significant results using global self-esteem,
without taking domain-specificity into account.
It appears that Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) also share this conceptualization of
global self-esteem. Expanding upon Leary et al.’s (1995b) fuel gauge metaphor, they
believe that global self-esteem would be akin to a gauge that assessed overall engine
functioning. This gauge would monitor all individual systems within the engine, and a
problem with any one individual system would be indicated by a reaction in this engine
gauge. However, an indication of a problem (by this gauge) would not make it overtly
obvious (to the untrained eye) as to which system with which there actually was a
problem. In addition, if one were to take his car to one who is trained to find the
offending system, despite the indication o f a problem with “overall engine functioning,”
the system would have to be directly affected in order to rectify the engine trouble. Once
this system was fixed, the indicator of overall engine functioning would also reflect the
new, repaired functioning of this individual system.
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In Tesser and Cornell’s (1991) Study 1, the experimenters did not control for
the domain in which participants’ affirmed themselves. Specifically, even though the
affirmation domain was manipulated so that it was either of high or low self-relevance to
each participant, the domain in which they affirmed themselves may or may not have
been in a similar domain as that of the perceived rejection.1 Based upon the hypotheses of
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), therefore, I hypothesize that the results of Tesser and
Cornell’s Study 1 could be differently affected dependent upon both the domain in which
one’s self-esteem is injured and the domain in which one affirms oneself.
The Current Experiment
The design of the current experiment represents an attempt to more fully test the
hypothesis of domain-specificity, as recently proposed by Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999).
To begin with, this experiment was designed to both expand upon the research conducted
by Leary et al. and improve upon the paradigm that Glenn (1998) recently used to
demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem. In addition to these goals, this
experiment was also designed to expand upon research conducted by Tesser and Cornell
(1991) in order to demonstrate the benefit that the domain-specificity hypothesis might
bring to previous research on self-esteem.
In order to accomplish these goals, I concluded that the best approach would be to
essentially combine aspects of the studies designed by Leary et al. (1995b), Glenn (1998),
and Tesser and Cornell (1991). Because Glenn’s experiment may have been most flawed
by not framing the perceived mate-selection rejection in a competitive paradigm, I first
attempted to devise a method by which a mate-selection competitive paradigm could be
introduced. It was important, however, that the competitive paradigm that was introduced
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not change the design of the experiment to a great degree from that used by both Leary
et al- and Glenn, as one of the primary purposes of the current experiment was to
demonstrate the differential effects (to their studies) that could be mediated by the
application of the domain-specific hypothesis. I felt that the competitive situation used by
Tesser and Cornell offered such a design.
Not only had Tesser and Cornell (1991) already demonstrated that their
competitive design was effective, but it also allowed me to apply aspects of Leary et al.’s
(1995b) and Glenn’s (1998) studies, along with the added benefit of demonstrating how
past self-esteem research might benefit from the application of the domain-specific
hypothesis. As has been previously mentioned, the results o f Tesser and Cornell’s Study
1 suggest that affirmation in a domain of high self-relevance can offset the effects of a
perceived lost competition upon one’s global self-esteem. Expanding upon these findings,
I hypothesized that, if self-esteem were domain-specific, the mate-selection self-esteem
o f participants who lost a perceived competition in the domain of mate-selection would
only be offset by an affirmation in mate-selection (the same domain that would be
monitoring the lost competition).
This hypothesis was made based upon a few assumptions. To begin with, it can be
assumed that, for all persons, mate-selection is a domain of high self-relevance. This
assumption is based primarily upon literature that have presented robust data that suggest
that humans have a strong motivation to determine their relative mate-value (c.f. Kenrick,
et al., 1993; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 1999; Wright, 1994). Second, because Kirkpatrick and
Ellis hypothesize that a mate-selection sociometer would only be sensitive to information
that deals with mate-selection and derivation of mate-value, information that leads mate-
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selection self-esteem to be injured should only be able to be offset by information that
would directly increase mate-selection self-esteem. Conversely, an injury to mateselection self-esteem should not be able to be offset by affirmation (in a domain of high
self-relevance) that is not in the domain of mate-selection.
I posited that these same results might also be found when assessing global self
esteem (after one perceives a loss in a mate-selection competition). First, as previously
mentioned, one could conceive of global self-esteem as an overall assessment of the
current state of all o f one’s individual domains of self-esteem. If mate-selection self
esteem were injured, this injury is likely to be evidenced by a decrease in global self
esteem, but not a decrease that would be comparable to the decrease evidenced
(specifically) in mate-selection self-esteem. As was also previously mentioned, I
hypothesize that an affirmation in mate-selection would lead to an increase in mateselection self-esteem. Based upon this hypothesis, I therefore posit that this increase
would be further indicated in global self-esteem, but not to the degree seen in mateselection self-esteem. Up to this point, the effects that one would expect to see in global
self-esteem are not very different from those that one would expect to see in mateselection self-esteem.
Whereas one would not expect that an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain
o f high self-relevance would affect mate-selection self-esteem, such an affirmation would
be expected to affect global self-esteem. Following along with the conceptualization of
global self-esteem as an overall assessment o f one’s individual domains o f self-esteem,
an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain of high self-relevance should positively
affect some (other) domain of self-esteem, an effect that should be evidenced in global
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self-esteem. In support, Tesser and Cornell (1991) have previously demonstrated that
affirmation in a domain of high self-relevance positively affects global self-esteem.
Therefore, in conclusion, the current experiment employs a perceived loss in a
competitive domain that is assumed to be mate-selection. Based upon the hypotheses of
Leary and Downs (1995) and Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) and also upon the
experimental findings of Tesser and Cornell (1991), I designed the current experiment to
examine the differential effects of mate-selection and non-mate-selection affirmations
upon different measures o f self-esteem.
Method
In the current experiment, affirmation was manipulated in a 2x2 between-subjects
design. Participants were given the opportunity to affirm themselves in the mate-selection
domain, in the coalitional domain, in both of these domains, or in neither of these
domains. Two experimenters tested all participants. Each experimenter tested two
participants at a time. Participants were randomly placed into conditions so that there was
an equal chance that each experimenter would administer any of the four conditions.
Each experimenter tested roughly one-half of the participants.
Participants
The participants in this experiment were 69 male introductory psychology
students from the College of William & Mary, ranging in age from 18 to 22 years old,
who had earlier indicated on a mass-testing questionnaire that they were not currently
involved in a heterosexual dating relationship. Participants were personally contacted and
asked to participate in this experiment. All participants were required to complete
research hours and therefore received course credit for their involvement.
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Selection Criteria
The criteria, which were used to select participants, were chosen because I
hypothesized that participants with these characteristics would be best suited for the
design of the experiment. First, I hypothesized that males would be more likely than
females to interpret rejection by someone of the opposite sex in a mate-selection context.
This hypothesis was based in part upon literature that implies that men are more likely to
perceive interpersonal interactions with someone of the opposite sex in a mate-selection
context (Buss, 1994). In particular, Buss has articulated the advantages (in terms of
inclusive fitness) of short-term sexual relations (i.e. casual sex) for males; by so doing,
males have the opportunity to produce more offspring. Because casual sex is generally
advantageous for males, it is adaptive for males to be ready to reproduce as soon as the
opportunity presents itself. For example, Buss has reported results from studies in which
both men and women were asked how they would respond if someone o f the opposite
gender had approached them and asked them to have sex. In one of these studies, 100%
of the women reported that they would emphatically decline. O f men, however, 75%
reported that they would say yes.
Second, I thought that the perceived rejection would be more likely to affect the
participants’ mate-selection self-esteem if the male participants were not currently in a
heterosexual dating relationship. This second criterion was included because I concluded
that, if a mate-selection sociometer functions to monitor mate-selection information, the
nature of which may affect future mate-selection behavior and strategy, those who are not
in a mating relationship would be especially attentive to stimuli that may help them to
better establish their mate-value (consistent with Kirkpatrick and Ellis, 1999). It was
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assumed, therefore, that this criterion would further increase the effectiveness of the
perceived rejection.
Student Participation
According to mass-testing data, which were collected roughly two months prior to
the current experiment, and given my criteria, 107 students were eligible to participate. I
first asked all 107 of these eligible students, via email, if they would like to participate in
the current experiment. Once a reply was received from these eligible persons, they were
contacted by phone to make an appointment for an experimental session. For those
potential participants who did not respond to this initial email, an attempt was made to
contact them by phone.
Following these initial attempts to contact potential participants, a further attempt
was made to contact those with whom I had not yet spoken. Additional emails were sent
and multiple phone calls were made to these persons. O f those persons with whom I was
able to speak, 12 declined to participate. I was unable to get in touch with eight students.
O f those students for whom I was able to schedule an experimental session, four did not
show up, and four cancelled due to unforeseen conflicts. In addition to these persons who
did not participate in the current experiment, data from six pilot participants (who were
the first six participants tested) were not included. Thus, data from 69 participants were
available for analysis.
Materials
Affirmation Materials
Mate-selection statements and paragraphs. As has been previously mentioned, the
degree o f desirability of each of one’s mate-characteristics is likely to vary. In addition to
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this individual variability, the characteristics that are perceived to be highly desirable
in one male may not be perceived to be highly desirable in another, due to differences
between males. Due to both individual and interpersonal variability, therefore, for any
given male, certain characteristics indicative of mate-value will be prized for their
perceived relative high value, whereas other characteristics will not be as prized due to
their perceived relative low value. Because it can be inferred that a characteristic that is
perceived to be of high value is also therefore highly self-relevant, I concluded that the
best method by which to discover highly self-relevant aspects o f mate-selection, in order
to facilitate a mate-selection affirmation for any given male participant, was to allow
them to rank-order a number of male mate-value characteristics in a fashion similar to
that utilized by Tesser and Cornell (1991).
To enable participants to indicate their most valued characteristic of mate-value, I
created a set of mate-value characteristics. This set was created so as to resemble the set
o f interest categories outlined in the Allport-Vemon Study of Values scale; it therefore
does not represent a comprehensive list of all characteristics that have been suggested to
be indicative of male mate-value. In order to create such a list, six characteristics that I
thought to be the most important indicators of male mate-value were chosen. Those
characteristics were: 1) Physical attractiveness, 2) Athleticism/physical prowess, 3)
Intelligence/mental acumen, 4) Resource possession, 5) Considerateness/kindness, and 6)
Resource potential. For presentation to participants, these characteristics were formatted
in the form o f a statement, in order to more easily elicit the degree to which participants
valued each characteristic. Respectively, those statements were: 1)1 value my physical
attractiveness, 2) I value my athleticism, 3) I value my intelligence, 4) I value that I have
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the means to purchase what I want, 4) I value that I am kind and considerate, and 5) I
value that I am ambitious and hard working. As is evident in these statements, the
resource possession and resource potential characteristics were tailored for presentation
in order to make them appear less scientific and more colloquial.

•y.

In addition to the six mate-selection statements, I also created a descriptive
paragraph for each statement. These paragraphs were created for a few reasons. To begin
with, they were constructed in an attempt to better replicate the design used by Tesser and
Cornell (1991). Second, they were created to provide a more thorough depiction of the
characteristic outlined in the statement, so as to clarify any inherent ambiguity. Lastly,
each of these paragraphs contains attributes that I thought to be characteristic of someone
who would indicate that the accompanying statement was their most valued of the six
statements. This was done in an attempt to assure that the only people who chose a given
statement as their most valued were those who actually perceived that characteristic to be
highly valued in themselves, and not that they thought that that characteristic was highly
valued by people in general. The following is an example of one of these paragraphs (see
Appendix C for a comprehensive listing):
I value mv athleticism. People who are athletic have impressive physical skills
and abilities. Because of these skills, such people usually excel in sports or other
competitive physical activities and are therefore often recognized for their
excellence. Due to their ability, athletic people seek out and enjoy participation in
sports or other competitive physical activities.
As this example paragraph indicates, all of the paragraphs and statements were presented
in a manner similar to that of those in the Allport-Vemon Study o f Values scale, with the
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summary statement comprising the first sentence of the paragraph. Each statement was
also underlined in an attempt to stress that the participant was deciding the degree to
which he comparatively valued the statement. Finally, all six statements and their
accompanying paragraphs were presented on a single sheet with instructions indicating
that each participant was to rank-order the six paragraphs, where 1st equaled most valued
xL

and 6 equaled least valued.
Although the only purpose of this procedure was to discover the participants’
most valued mate-value characteristic, participants were nonetheless asked to rank-order
all six of the statements. To begin with, this was done by Tesser and Cornell (1991), and
doing so would keep the procedure of the current experiment similar to their procedure.
Next, I thought that forcing participants to rank-order all o f the statements forced them to
read and evaluate all of the statements more carefully. This therefore may have lowered
the possibility that a participant chose a statement without having assessed its value
relative to the other possible choices, increasing the possibility that their choice for most
valued statement was indeed their most valued mate-value characteristic. Finally, I
thought that rank-ordering the statements would allow participants to more easily see the
relative value o f each of the statements.
Despite the advantages of having participants rank-order the statements, there
were a few disadvantages to using this procedure. In particular, it was possible that
forcing participants to rank-order the statements by value would have increased the
difficulty of the task, because it was possible that multiple characteristics may have been
deemed by the participants to be o f equal or similar value. In addition, due to this issue, it
was possible that participants would have spent an undue amount of time deciding the

44
ordering of their least valued statements, the order of which was actually of no concern
to the design o f the current experiment. Even though these problems may have impeded
the experiment, I decided that the positive benefits of the rank-ordering outweighed the
potential negatives. Therefore, in an attempt to offset the potentially undesirable effects
of rank-ordering, a paragraph was added to the instructions. This paragraph stressed that
the participants might value all of the statements, and that choosing one to be more highly
valued than the other did not indicate that they either disagreed with that statement or did
not consider it to be of high value.
Coalitional statements and paragraphs. In order to afford one an affirmation in a
non-mate-selection domain, six additional statements and paragraphs were employed.
The original intention was to utilize the six categories from the Allport-Vemon Study of
Values scale. Unfortunately, upon further investigation and contemplation, I decided that
many, if not all, of the dominant interests outlined in the Study of Values scale
overlapped in some way with the mate-value characteristics that were chosen to afford
one a mate-selection affirmation. I concluded, therefore, that using these interest
categories might not afford one an affirmation in a non-mate-selection domain.
Based upon previous research (Williams, 1998) and Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s
(1999) hypothesis that cooperative sociometers are fundamentally different from
competitive sociometers, I decided to utilize coalitional self-esteem as the non-mateselection domain. To do so, a set o f six coalitional statements and paragraphs were
created to afford participants an affirmation in the coalitional domain (in a manner
similar to those created to afford an affirmation in mate-selection). I decided that the six
coalitional statements and paragraphs would represent different types of coalitions. The
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initial objective was to use six characteristics that were indicative of one’s perceived
coalitional-value, but many of these characteristics (such as dependability) appeared to
have some overlap with the characteristics indicative of mate-value. In order to further
separate these paragraphs from those that were used to afford the mate-selection
affirmation, yet still provide participants with a choice of coalitionally related items that
would be differentially valued, I chose to use types of coalitions. Six types of coalitions
were chosen so that this selection procedure would be similar to that employed for the
mate-selection affirmation, and therefore be similar to Tesser and Cornell’s (1991)
original usage; the list is therefore not assumed to be exhaustive.
I decided to utilize what I hypothesized to be the six most important types of
coalitions. The coalitions that were chosen were: 1) Same-sex friendships, 2)
Clubs/organizations, 3) Ethnic heritage, 4) Family, 5) U.S. citizenship, and 6) Religious
group. The statements that were created to inquire about the relative value o f these types
of coalitions were, respectively: 1)1 value my same-sex friendships, 2) I value the clubs
and organizations in which I am involved, 3)1 value my ethnic heritage, 4) I value my
family, 5) I value being a citizen of the United States, and 6) I value my religious group.
An example of a paragraph that was constructed for one of these statements is (see
Appendix D for a complete listing o f all paragraphs used):
I value mv same-sex friendships. Friendship refers to the interpersonal
relationships one has with other persons of the same sex (non-relatives). Someone
who has a friendship has more than just an acquaintance. In particular, friends not
only tend to spend time with each other, but they also support each other’s goals
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and causes. Due to the nature of this relationship, friends often feel a strong
bond between them.
All six coalitional statements and their accompanying paragraphs were presented on a
single sheet and contained the same instructions as those used for mate-selection.
Questions relating to the statements and paragraphs. In the experiments conducted
by Tesser and Cornell (1991), the affirmation procedure depended upon the participant’s
choice of most important Allport-Vemon interest category. Once the participant had
indicated their most important interest category, those in the affirmation condition
received a ten-item subscale of that Allport-Vemon category. Tesser and Cornell have
proposed that responding to these items, which were related to one’s most important
interest category, allowed participants to affirm that highly relevant interest. Following
this logic, a set ten items was created for each mate-value characteristic (each set was
assumed to be related to the mate-value characteristic for which it was created). In
addition, a set of ten items was created for each of the types o f coalitions (each set was
assumed to be related to the coalitional type for which it was created).
Each set o f ten items was constmcted so that all items in the set were directly
related to the paragraph for which it was created. Specifically, I created each item in
order to facilitate affirmation of each participant’s chosen most valued mate-value
characteristic or most valued type of coalition. For example, one of the items that was
created for the mate-value characteristic of physical attractiveness was: “I often get
compliments on my physical appearance” (see Appendix E for all items created for all
mate-value characteristics). One of the items that was created for the ethnic heritage
coalition type was: “Being with people of the same ancestry or race as me makes me feel
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like I have a bond with a group of other people” (see Appendix F for all items created
for all types of coalitions). A set of ten items was created for all mate-value
characteristics and all types of coalitions so that a set would be available for all
participants, regardless of their choice of most valued mate characteristic or coalition. In
all, 120 items were created for this purpose (12 sets of 10 items each). Once I had created
each of these sets of items, each was placed on a separate sheet in order to facilitate
presentation to participants. In addition to the items, instructions were also included that
asked participants to indicate, on a five-point Likert-type response scale, the degree to
which they typically or generally agreed with each of the items.
Along with the construction of these ten-item sets, a set o f ten filler items was
also created. I created this set for the equal portion of participants who served as controls
and therefore did not affirm themselves in either the mate-selection or coalitional
domains. These filler items were constructed so that they were similar to the items that
were created for the mate-selection and coalitional domains, insomuch that they were
self-referent or inquired as to the participants’ opinions. In contrast to the other sets of
items that were created, however, I intentionally constructed these items so that they were
relatively unrelated to either the mate-selection or coalitional domains. One such filler
item that was used is: “It is best for a college to offer as many majors as is possible” (see
Appendix G for a list of all filler items used). The filler items were placed on a single
sheet of paper in a manner similar to that used to present the other items, and therefore
also included the same instructions used with the other items.
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Oral Presentation of Personal Information
To further enhance the illusion of perceived rejection, some oral response
questions were also utilized. In particular, I hypothesized that orally responding to
questions would enhance the perceived rejection in two ways. To begin with, these
questions were self-referent, and I therefore thought that responding to them would
further enhance the perception that one was rejected in lieu of someone else based upon
personal characteristics that were known to the rejector (the perceived rejector will
heretofore be referred to as Participant C). Second, I thought that responding to these
questions orally would make the presence o f Participant C seem more tangible, as
compared to the perception that participants would have if they purely provided
information for Participant C via paper and pen. Orally responding to self-referent
questions has been used for these purposes in previous experiments (Glenn, 1998; Leary
et al., 1995b; Leary et al., 1998).
Content of oral-response questions. The oral response questions that were used
both came from and were based upon those used in Leary et al.’s (1995b) Study 4. All of
the questions that were used in that study were not utilized in the current experiment,
however, based upon the information that some of them requested that participants recall.
In particular, a few of the questions requested that participants discuss some of their best
and worst past experiences; one such question was: “What do you feel most proud of in
your past and what do you feel most ashamed of?” I assumed that questions of this nature
posed a conflict with the design of the current experiment. Because these questions asked
participants to discuss some o f their best moments (in some form), and because
someone’s best moments are most likely to have occurred in a domain that was highly
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self-relevant, I concluded that answering questions such as these might enable
participants to affirm themselves before the manipulated affirmation condition was
introduced. To avoid this conflict, questions of this nature were not used.
After all of the conflicting questions that were used by Leary et al. (1995b) were
removed, two questions remained. These two questions were employed in the current
experiment. The first of these questions was: “What qualities in other people do you
appreciate and what qualities do you find annoying?”; the second was: “What features do
you most like and dislike about your mother and father?” In addition to these two
questions, two additional questions were created. The first of these questions was: “What
are your favorite and least-favorite classes this semester, and why?”; the second was:
“Have you decided what your major will be? If so, why? If not, what are you
considering?” I assumed that these questions, like the two questions used from Leary et
al., did not request that participants recall, to a significant degree, any information that
would conflict with the design of the current experiment. In addition, these questions
were designed to inquire about information that I thought to be less personal than that
inquired about by the two questions used from Leary et al. This was done so that the list
of questions would start with those that inquired about less personal information and
move into inquiries about more personal information (see Appendix H for the sheet that
was given to participants).
The instructions that were included with these questions were adapted from those
used by Leary et al. (1995b) and Glenn (1998). These instructions informed the
participants to choose any question from the list and answer it orally into a microphone,
as if they were having a face-to-face interaction with Participant C. They were told to
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answer the question for about five minutes, and to move on to another question if they
ran out of things to say about their first choice. The answers that participants provided for
these questions were not monitored, and were not explicitly used in any way in the
current experiment.
Self-Esteem Scales
In this experiment, three measures of self-esteem were utilized as dependent
variables. O f these three, two were designed to assess domains of self-esteem and one
was designed to assess global self-esteem. The two measures designed to assess domains
o f self-esteem were created by me and have been used in previous studies (Williams,
1998, 1999; Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998).
The first of the two domain-specific measures, the mate-selection self-esteem
scale, was used in the form in which it was most recently utilized (Williams &
Kirkpatrick, 1998). This version of the mate-selection self-esteem scale consists of
twelve items that I hypothesized to be related to mate-selection. One of these items was:
“When I start a conversation with someone of the opposite sex whom I do not know, that
person usually seems eager to talk to me.” (see Appendix A for a complete listing o f all
twelve items used).
The second of the two domain-specific measures was the coalitional self-esteem
scale. This scale consists of eight items that I hypothesized to be related to coalitional
self-esteem. One of these items was: “When I go somewhere new, it doesn’t take me long
\

to develop a close-knit circle of friends.” (see Appendix B for a complete listing of all
eight items used).
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The final measure that was used assessed global self-esteem and is known as
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). This scale has been used
extensively in the literature and is assumed to assess general or global self-esteem (e.g. I
feel like a person who has a number o f good qualities; see Appendix I for a complete
listing of all items). Responses to the ten items were made on a five point Likert-type
scale.
Other Scales
In addition to the three self-esteem scales that were included in this experiment, a
measure of self-concept clarity was also employed as a fourth dependent variable.
Research has demonstrated a strong link between self-concept clarity and global self
esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee,
& Lehman, 1996). In addition, the literature also suggests that self-concept clarity can
also serve to affect the degree to which people are affected by external, self-relevant
information (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). Due to the reported relationship
between self-esteem and self-concept clarity, Campbell et al.’s (1996) Self-Concept
Clarity (SCC) Scale was utilized as an additional dependent variable.
The SCC Scale is a twelve-item scale that assesses the degree to which one is
certain about one’s own self-aspects or attributes. The instructions request participants to
indicate the degree to which they agree with each of the items of the scale, using a fivepoint Likert-type scale for each item. An example o f one o f the items that was included
within this scale is: “My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another” (see
Appendix J for a full list o f all 12 items used). This scale has been demonstrated to have
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high internal consistency (a = .86), with an average item-total correlation of .54
(Campbell et al., 1996).
Computer Administration
All three o f the employed self-esteem scales were placed, along with the SCC
Scale, within a computer program, in order to facilitate presentation to participants. The
program was created using the MEL Professional authoring software, and was written so
that it would be run in a DOS-based environment. This program allowed both the
participants’ responses and response times to be recorded. IBM-compatible PC
computers, with DOS installed, were employed for administration of this program.
The program began with an instruction screen that informed the participants that
they would be indicating the degree to which they agreed with statements that would
appear on upcoming screens. The instructions further informed the participants that they
were to indicate their degree of agreement for each statement by pressing a number, from
1 to 5, on the keyboard, where one equaled strongly disagree and five equaled strongly
agree. Once participants left this screen, the next screen began the presentation o f the
self-esteem and SCC items. All self-esteem and SCC items were randomly presented
without replacement; a total of 30 self-esteem items and 12 SCC items were therefore
presented to each participant. When each statement appeared on the screen, a brief
comment appeared underneath each statement that offered the participant a reminder that
the scale was anchored so that one equaled strongly disagree and five equaled strongly
agree. This brief comment appeared and was identical for all items that were presented.
Following the presentation of all o f the self-esteem and SCC items, two additional
questions were presented, each on its own screen. The first question that was presented
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asked, “Are you currently involved in a heterosexual dating relationship?” The screen
contained the possible answers, and indicated that pressing the number one equaled “no”
and number two equaled “yes.” The second question that was asked was: “If you
answered yes to the last question, for how long have you been in this relationship?” Once
again the screen contained the possible answers, and indicated that pressing the number
one equaled “I answered no,” two equaled “ 1 - 3 weeks,” three equaled “ 1 - 2 months,”
four equaled “3 - 1 2 months,” and five equaled “More than 12 months.”
These last two questions were added in order to more accurately assess each
participant’s dating status as o f the actual date of the experiment. I concluded that this
was necessary, given my hypothesis that the “not dating” criterion was important to the
effectiveness of the perceived rejection. In particular, because each participant’s dating
status was assessed via a mass-testing questionnaire that was administered about two
months before the current experiment, I hypothesized that participants may have entered
a heterosexual dating relationship since that time (and that this might therefore affect the
results o f the study). In addition, the second question (how long have you been in this
relationship) allowed me to confirm the accuracy of the data collected in mass-testing;
that is, this question allowed participants to report that they had been in a heterosexual
dating relationship for a period longer than two months (the time since the mass-testing
data were collected).
Experimental Environment
All experimental sessions were conducted in a social psychology laboratory. This
laboratory had multiple, adjacent experimental rooms. This laboratory also had a waiting
room that preceded entry into any o f the subsequent experimental rooms. For this
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experiment, three of the rooms were utilized, in addition to the initial waiting room.
The layout of the three experimental rooms was such that the middle room contained two
two-way mirrors. Each of these mirrors allowed one located in this middle room to see
into each o f the two adjacent rooms, which were located on either side of this middle
room.
The only experimental rooms that were explicitly used for participants were the
two rooms that were located on either side of the middle experimental room. Situated in
each o f these rooms were a chair, a table, and a computer that sat upon the table. The
lights in the middle room were dimmed so that the middle room was not visible through
either o f the two two-way mirrors that were located in these two adjacent experimental
rooms. This was done in order to make it more believable that Participant C was located
in the middle room and could see any given participant (without any participant being
able to see Participant C). Also situated on the table in each of these two experimental
rooms was a microphone. The cables from both of these two microphones were placed so
that they ran from the microphones and went through holes in the walls that led into the
middle room. This procedure was modeled after that used by Glenn (1998), and was done
to give participants the perception that Participant C could conceivably be listening to
their oral responses (via headphones) in the middle room.
Procedure
Score Derivation for Scales
The computer program, which was used to administer all of the scales, created a
separate set of data for each participant, each of which was inserted into an electronic
data file. The data for this study were extracted from these electronic data files. Once all
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of the data were acquired, the responses to certain items for each o f the self-esteem
scales and the SCC Scale were reverse-scored. Two total scores were then calculated for
each self-esteem scale and for the SCC Scale. The first total score was calculated by
computing the mean of each scale’s item-responses (this was done separately for each
self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale). For the second total score, this same procedure was
performed, for each self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale, except that each scale’s itemresponse times were used. Thus, three self-esteem scores and one SCC score were
calculated using the responses and three self-esteem scores and one SCC score were
calculated using the response times.
Experimental Procedure
Two male participants participated in each experimental session. The
experimental session did not begin until both participants had arrived; therefore, if one
participant arrived before the other, that participant was asked to wait until the last
participant arrived. As each participant arrived, he was randomly assigned to one o f four
conditions: 1) mate-selection affirmation, 2) coalitional affirmation, 3) affirmation in
both the mate-selection and the coalitional domains, and 4) no affirmation. Each
participant was also arbitrarily given the label of “Participant A” or “Participant B.” As
soon as both participants were present, the two together were told that the experiment
involved the two of them and a third participant, Participant C, who had arrived earlier
(in reality, there was no Participant C). Each participant was then taken into a separate
room.
Once each participant was in his own room, he was told that the purpose o f the
first part o f the experiment was for them to provide some personal information so that
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Participant C could decide with whom (of the two participants) to participate in the
second part of the experiment. They were further informed that whomever was not
chosen would participate in the second part of the experiment alone. Participants were
then given two sheets o f paper. One of these sheets contained the six mate-selection
statements and paragraphs, and the other contained the six coalitional statements and
paragraphs. Participants then separately rank-ordered the six paragraphs on each sheet.
Once completed, the experimenter collected these sheets from each participant, and
informed the participants that he was going to deliver the sheets to Participant C for
review.
When the experimenter returned, he asked each participant to respond to some
self-referent questions into a microphone. The questions, which were listed on a single
page, were given to each participant. They were next informed that Participant C was
going to be listening to their responses, using headphones, in an adjacent room. The
experimenter also informed each participant that the room in which Participant C was
located allowed Participant C to see both him and the other participant by way of a twoway mirror (but that neither o f the participants could see Participant C). At this time, the
experimenter began to refer to Participant C using female-specific pronouns, in an
attempt to subtly give each participant the perception that Participant C was female.
After about five minutes o f oral responding, the experimenter asked each
participant to stop responding to the questions. The experimenter then asked the
participants to complete an additional questionnaire. This additional questionnaire
represented the affirmation manipulation. The questionnaire that each participant
received depended both upon his random assignment and his previous rank-ordering of
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the statements and paragraphs. For those in the mate-selection affirmation and
coalitional affirmation conditions, the additional questionnaire was the ten-item scale that
contained items related to the paragraph that those participants had earlier ranked as 1st
(most valued). Those in the “both” affirmation condition, however, received two
questionnaires, the ten-item questionnaire that contained items related to their most
valued mate-selection statement and paragraph and the ten-item questionnaire that
contained items that related to their most valued coalitional statement and paragraph.
Those in the no-affirmation condition received the set of ten filler items that were not
related to mate-selection or coalitions. Each participant was informed that, while he was
completing this extra questionnaire, the other participant (either Participant A or B,
depending upon assignment) would be completing his oral response questions (actually,
both Participant A and B were run simultaneously).
Once the additional measure had been completed, each participant was informed
that Participant C had made her decision, had not chosen to participate with him, and had
instead chosen to participate with the other participant (either Participant A or B,
depending upon assignment). After each participant was given this information, the
experimenter informed him that, because he was to participate alone, his involvement in
the study would take less time. The experimenter then proceeded to comment that his
advisor had requested that, if the experiment was not going to take the entire period, the
experimenter should collect some additional data for a separate study. The experimenter
then commented that he would really like to get the other data collection out o f the way
as soon as possible, because his advisor would be disappointed if he failed to collect the
data. The experimenter then asked each participant if he would mind doing this, and
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informed each participant that a small computer task was all that would encompass the
extent o f the information that he needed to collect for his advisor. The computer task that
each participant then completed was actually the computer program that contained the
mate-selection self-esteem scale, the coalitional self-esteem scale, the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale, and the SCC Scale.
Once each participant had completed these computer measures, he was debriefed
as to the true nature of the experiment. In addition to this debriefing, each participant was
assured that all participants had not been chosen to participate in the second part of the
experiment, regardless of the information that each had provided. It was also thoroughly
stressed that Participant C did not exist, and this was physically demonstrated to each
participant. At this time, all participants were also asked other questions regarding the
experiment. Specifically, participants were asked if they either knew or were suspicious
o f the true nature of the experiment. In addition, participants were queried to assure that
they had thought that Participant C was female. Additional comments made by
participants were also recorded. All participants were thanked for their participation.
Results
The purpose of the current experiment was to examine the differential effects of
mate-selection and coalitional affirmations upon different measures o f self-esteem. To do
so, the primary analyses employed to analyze the data were 2x2 ANOVAs. The two
independent variables were mate-selection affirmation (yes-no) and coalitional
affirmation (yes-no). A separate 2x2 ANOVA was run for each of the four scales used as
dependent variables: the mate-selection self-esteem scale, the coalitional self-esteem
scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and the Self-Concept Clarity (SCC) Scale.
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Based upon the domain-specific hypotheses of Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), I
made a number of hypotheses for the current experiment. For my dependent variable of
principal interest, the mate-selection self-esteem scale, I hypothesized that I would find a
significant main effect of the mate-selection affirmation. I also hypothesized that, for this
scale, I would neither find a main effect of coalitional affirmation nor an interaction
between the affirmation types. These hypotheses were based on the assumption that only
a mate-selection affirmation would affect mate-selection self-esteem.
For the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, I hypothesized that the findings would be
different. I posited that there would be small main effects of both the mate-selection and
coalitional affirmations on global self-esteem. I assumed, however, that the mateselection affirmation would not increase global self-esteem to a degree as great as the
mate-selection affirmation would increase mate-selection self-esteem. I also did not
expect to find a significant interaction between affirmation types for the Rosenberg scale.
These hypotheses were based upon a few assumptions. First, I assumed that, because the
self-esteem injury was in the mate-selection domain, the mate-selection affirmation
would serve to increase global self-esteem, by directly affecting mate-selection self
esteem. But, because mate-selection self-esteem can be envisioned as only part of the
overall self-esteem assessment represented by global self-esteem, I assumed that global
self-esteem would not increase to a degree as great as mate-selection self-esteem. Second,
I also assumed that, although the coalitional affirmation would not affect the mateselection injury, it would increase coalitional self-esteem, and that this increase would be
evidenced by an increase in global self-esteem.
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For the coalitional self-esteem scale, I hypothesized that there would be no
main effect o f mate-selection affirmation and no interaction. I predicted, however, that I
might find a small main effect of the coalitional affirmation. These hypotheses were
based upon a few assumptions. First, I assumed that an affirmation in the mate-selection
domain would not affect coalitional self-esteem, which I have presumed to be a separate
domain. Second, using this same reasoning, I assumed that coalitional self-esteem would
not be significantly affected by the mate-selection injury incurred in the experiment.
However, I assumed that the positive effects of the coalitional affirmation would serve to
nonetheless increase coalitional self-esteem. I made no specific hypotheses for the SCC
Scale, and included it in these analyses as an alternative method by which to assess self
esteem.
Preliminary Analyses
Reliability
Reliability analyses were conducted on the data to test the internal consistency of
all scales that were utilized. Alpha coefficients were found to be adequate for all scales
employed. The mate-selection self-esteem scale had an alpha of .89, with item-total
correlations ranging from .18 to .73. The coalitional self-esteem scale had an alpha of .73,
with item-total correlations ranging from .19 to .59. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
had an alpha o f .88, with item-total correlations ranging from .43 to .76. The SelfConcept Clarity Scale had an alpha of .87, with item-total correlations ranging from .32
to .72.
For the mate-selection self-esteem scale, in addition to examining alpha
coefficients, test-retest reliability was also assessed. This analysis was facilitated by using
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data collected via the mass-testing questionnaire that was administered roughly two
months previous to the current experiment. All participants in the current experiment
were administered this mass-testing questionnaire, which included the version of the
mate-selection self-esteem scale that was employed in the current experiment. The mateselection self-esteem of participants in the current experiment, as assessed during this
mass-testing procedure, was found to be highly positively correlated with their mateselection self-esteem as assessed in the current experiment, r = .79, p < .01.
Data Preparation
Following the tests of reliability, the data for certain participants were removed
for all subsequent analyses. Seven participants, who had indicated earlier in a masstesting questionnaire that they were not in a heterosexual dating relationship, indicated
during the current experiment that their dating status had changed. Because these seven
participants indicated that they had become involved in a heterosexual dating relationship
since the mass-testing assessment, their data were removed. In addition, the data from
three other participants were removed based on their comments during debriefing. The
data for two or these participants were removed because they indicated that they did not
think that “Participant C” was female. The data for one additional participant were
removed because that participant indicated that he “knew” that there really was no
Participant C. In total, data for ten participants were removed, leaving a final sample size
o f 59.
Correlations Among Dependent Variables
Correlations among the mate-selection self-esteem scale, coalitional self-esteem
scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC) were
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computed and are displayed in Table 1. Notably, the mate-selection self-esteem scale
was found to be significantly correlated to the coalitional scale (r = .55, p < .01), the
Rosenberg scale (r = .48, p < .01), and the SCC Scale (r = .44, p < .01).
The relationship between the mate-selection scale and the coalitional scale is
similar to that found previously using the eight-item mate-selection scale (r = .54, p <
.01; Williams, 1998). This moderate, yet significant, relationship demonstrates that they
assess a similar construct (self-esteem), yet are different enough to suggest that they
assess different aspects of self-esteem. The relationship between the mate-selection self/

esteem scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, however, is lower than that
previously found using the eight-item version o f the mate-selection scale (r = .63, p < .01;
Williams, 1998). This decreased relationship may further suggest that the new, twelveitem version o f the mate-selection scale more accurately assesses mate-selection self
esteem.
Analyses of Response Variables
Overall, the cell means appear to demonstrate a trend toward main effects on my
dependent variables (see Table 2 and Table 3 for a list of all cell means). In order to more
closely examine these possible effects, I began my two-way analyses with those
examining the effects upon my dependent variable of primary interest, mate-selection
self-esteem. Contrary to my predictions, the main effect of mate-selection affirmation on
mate-selection self-esteem was not significant, F (l, 55) = 2.61

.05. In addition to this

disappointing finding, and not only contrary to but demonstrating an opposite pattern
than that which I had predicted, a barely-significant main effect o f coalitional affirmation
on mate-selection self-esteem was found, F (l, 55) = 4.08, p < .05. As I expected, no
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interaction was found between mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation,
F(l, 55) = 0.00, p > *05.
I next examined the effects of my independent variables upon coalitional self
esteem. As I had predicted, a main effect of mate-selection affirmation upon coalitional
self-esteem was not found, F (l, 55) = 0.04, p > .05. Contrary to my predictions, a main
effect of coalitional affirmation upon coalitional self-esteem was also not found, F (l, 55)
= 1.20, p > .05. Note, however, that the difference in coalitional self-esteem between
having and not having a mate-selection affirmation was 0.03, whereas the difference
between having and not having a coalitional affirmation was 0.16, a finding that is at
least in the direction I had predicted. In particular, the estimated marginal means suggest
that coalitional self-esteem increased more for those who affirmed in the coalitional
domain (M = 3.86, SE = 0.10) compared to those who affirmed in mate-selection (M =
3.79, SE = 0.11). This difference, however, is very small. Examining the effect sizes,
however, revealed that the effects of the different affirmations were of different
magnitudes. The effect of the mate-selection affirmation on coalitional self-esteem was
nearly nonexistent, d = 0.05. The effect of the coalitional affirmation on coalitional self
esteem, however, was larger and moderately sized, d = 0.28. No interaction between
mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation was found, F (l, 55) = 0.00, p > .05.
When I examined the effects of the independent variables upon global self
esteem, as assessed by the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, no significant main effect of
mate-selection affirmation on global self-esteem was found, F (l, 55) = 1.40, p > .05. In
addition, no significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon global self-esteem was
found, F (l, 55) = 0.00, p > .05. These findings are contrary to my hypotheses. Note,
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however, that the difference in global self-esteem between having and not having a
mate-selection affirmation was 0.20, whereas the difference between having and not
having a coalitional affirmation was 0.01. These differences suggest that the mateselection affirmation affected global self-esteem differently from the coalitional
affirmation. In particular, the estimated marginal means suggest that global self-esteem
increased more for those who affirmed in mate-selection (M = 4.04, SE = 0.12) compared
to those who affirmed in the coalitional domain (M = 3.95, SE = 0.12). This difference,
however, is very small. Examining the effect sizes, however, revealed that the effects of
the different affirmations were of different magnitudes. The effect of the coalitional
affirmation on global self-esteem was nearly nonexistent, d = 0.02. The effect of the
mate-selection affirmation on global self-esteem, however, was larger and moderately
sized, d = 0.31. No interaction was found between mate-selection affirmation and
coalitional affirmation, F (l, 55) = 0.14, p > .05.
Neither a main effect of mate-selection affirmation, F (l, 55) = 1.66, p > .05, nor a
main effect of coalitional affirmation, F (l, 55) = 1.09, p > .05, was found on self-concept
clarity. No interaction between mate-selection affirmation and coalitional affirmation was
found, F (l, 55) = 0.34, p > .05.
For each o f my dependent variables, the overall trend in cell means appears to
support Tesser and ComelTs (1991) suggestion that affirmation prior to a self-evaluative
injury leads to increased self-esteem. For all scales, however, the greatest cell mean
corresponded to affirmation in both the mate-selection and coalitional domains,
suggesting that the two main effects are additive. It is also important to note that the
mate-selection self-esteem scale appeared to show the greatest increases in self-esteem
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for those who affirmed, relative to those who did not. Although the means for the type
of affirmation do not appear to be very different, this finding suggests that positive
effects of any affirmation prior to an injury to mate-selection self-esteem may be best
assessed by a measure o f mate-selection self-esteem.
In addition to two-way analyses, three-way analyses were also run. For these
analyses, a third, repeated-measures variable was introduced in order to examine the
interactions between scale types and experimental conditions. The first of these analyses
compared the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the coalitional scale. This analysis
provided the most direct test o f my hypothesis that having a mate-selection affirmation
would increase mate-selection self-esteem to a much greater degree than it would
increase coalitional self-esteem.
Contrary to these predictions, no significant main effects or interactions were
found (see Table 4 for a complete listing of results), at an alpha level of .05. The
interaction between scale type and mate-selection affirmation, however, demonstrated a
trend towards that which I had predicted. This trend suggested that there was a slightly
greater difference in self-esteem, between those who did and did not affirm in mateselection, apparent for mate-selection self-esteem relative to coalitional self-esteem, F (l,
55) = 2.43, p = .12. In particular, the estimated marginal means demonstrated that having
a mate-selection affirmation increased mate-selection self-esteem, M ~ 3.22, SE = 0.12,
relative to not having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 2.96, SE = 0.11. For coalitional
self-esteem, however, this was not apparent, and the effects of the affirmation were
nearly identical for those having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 3.79, SE = 0.11, and
those not having a mate-selection affirmation, M = 3.76, SE = 0.10. The effect sizes
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illustrate that the effect of the mate-selection affirmation on coalitional self-esteem was
nearly non-existent, d = 0.05. The effect of the mate-selection affirmation on mateselection self-esteem, however, was larger and moderately sized, d = 0.42. The analyses
also revealed a between-subjects main effect for coalitional affirmation that approached
significance, F (l, 55) = 3.21, p = .08. This finding is not surprising, however, given the
significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon mate-selection self-esteem that was
found previously in the two-way analysis.
The second of these analyses compared the mate-selection self-esteem scale and
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. I presumed that comparing these two scales was
important because I hypothesized that a mate-selection affirmation would increase mateselection self-esteem to a greater degree than it would increase global self-esteem.
Contrary to this hypothesis, no significant main effects or interactions were found (see
Table 5 for a complete listing of results). However, the interaction between scale type and
coalitional affirmation approached significance, F(l, 55) = 3.55, p = .07, suggesting that a
coalitional affirmation may differentially affect mate-selection and global self-esteem. In
particular, the estimated marginal means demonstrated that having a coalitional
affirmation increased mate-selection self-esteem, M = 3.26, SE = 0.11, relative to not
having a coalitional affirmation, M = 2.93, SE = 0.11. For global self-esteem, however,
this was not apparent, and the effects of the affirmation were nearly identical for those
having a coalitional affirmation, M = 3.95, SE = 0.12, and those not having a coalitional
affirmation, M = 3.94, SE = 0.12. The effect sizes further illustrate that the effect o f the
coalitional affirmation on global self-esteem was nearly non-existent, d = 0.02. The effect
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of the coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, however, was larger and
moderately sized, d = 0.52.
In addition to analyses of variance, analyses of covariance were also conducted.
In the first set of these analyses, the mate-selection self-esteem of participants, as earlier
assessed during a mass-testing procedure, was used as the covariate. When this
assessment of mate-selection self-esteem was included as a covariate in the two-way and
three-way analyses, the results, for all dependent measures, were found to not be different
than the original analyses of variance. Along with these analyses, additional analyses of
covariance were conducted. When the Rosenberg Self-Esteem and Self-Concept Clarity
scales were included as covariates in the two-way and three-way analyses using mateselection and coalitional self-esteem as the dependent measures, the results were no
different than those found using the original analyses of variance.
Analyses of Response Time Variables
Previous research has suggested that, in addition to employing explicit responses,
response latencies might also represent a method by which to assess self-esteem. In
particular, Nezlek and Gable (1998) have reported evidence for a negative relationship
between self-esteem and response latency; they found that, as self-esteem increases,
response latencies to self-esteem items tend to decrease. If this assumption were true, I
would make the same predictions for the current experiment using response latencies as
dependent variables as I did for explicit responses.
No significant relationships were discovered between any of the scales that were
employed in this experiment and their corresponding response times (n = 59). Three of
these four correlations were, however, negative. The weakest of these was that
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demonstrated between the SCC Scale and its reaction times, r = -.06. A stronger
negative relationship was found between the coalitional self-esteem scale and its reaction
times, r = -.13. The strongest of these relationships was evidenced by that between the
Rosenberg scale and its reaction times, r = -.22. The one positive relationship was found
between the mate-selection self-esteem scale and its reaction times, r = .11. Overall,
therefore, the correlations between explicit responses and their corresponding response
times do not appear to support the findings of Nezlek and Gable (1998).
All of the intercorrelations between reaction times, however, were found to be
significantly positively related, at an alpha of .01. The smallest of these significant
relationships was found between the reaction times for the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
and the SCC Scale, r = .65. The largest of these significant relationships was found
between the reaction times for the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the SCC Scale, r
= .83. These strong, significant, positive relationships are to be expected, given that they
are all measures o f reaction times, and some people, on average, are likely to respond
more quickly than others.
Despite the weak correlations between responses and response latencies, the same
analyses of variance that were conducted using the response variables were conducted
using the response time variables. These analyses were conducted for all scales that were
utilized, at an alpha level of .05. None of the two-way analyses revealed any significant
main effects or interactions for any o f the scales used in this experiment. In addition,
neither o f the three-way analyses, in which I added scale type as a repeated-measures
variable, demonstrated any significant main effects or interactions. This was true for both
the analyses comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the coalitional self
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esteem scale and the analyses comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale and the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. These findings are not surprising, given the results of the
correlational analyses, which indicated weak relationships between explicit responses and
their corresponding reaction times.
Discussion
Unfortunately, the results did not support any of my hypotheses that predicted
main effects or interactions. Due to this lack o f support, I am unable to make any clear
conclusions regarding the domain-specificity of self-esteem. In particular, the results of
the current experiment failed to provide evidence for two fundamental assumptions of my
hypotheses. First, the data did not indicate that a mate-selection self-esteem injury was
best remedied by an affirmation in mate-selection, relative to an affirmation in the
coalitional domain. This was most apparent in the non-significant main effect of mateselection affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem. Out of all o f the main effects that
were predicted, I assumed that this would be the largest. In addition to not supporting this
trend, the data actually indicated a significant main effect of coalitional affirmation upon
mate-selection self-esteem, a finding that is opposite of that which I had predicted.
Although this barely-significant finding could have been a result of chance, the data
nonetheless did not support my prediction.
Second, the current results also did not indicate that type of affirmation, either
mate-selection or coalitional, differentially affected, to a significant degree, the type of
self-esteem that was assessed. For example, if this experiment had functioned to
demonstrate the domain-specificity of self-esteem, one would have expected that the
difference in self-esteem between those who had a mate-selection affirmation and did not
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have a mate-selection affirmation would have been larger for mate-selection self
esteem relative to coalitional self-esteem. Even though the data demonstrated this trend, a
significant interaction was not found. In addition to this non-significant interaction,
results o f another interaction that approached significance actually suggested a trend
opposite o f that which I had hypothesized. Specifically, the almost significant interaction
between scale type, in this case the Rosenberg and the mate-selection self-esteem scales,
and coalitional affirmation suggested that the difference in self-esteem between those
who did and did not have a coalitional affirmation was greater for mate-selection self
esteem relative to global self-esteem. If these data had supported my hypotheses of
domain-specificity, the coalitional affirmation should not have differentially affected
mate-selection self-esteem.
Potential Problems with the Current Hypotheses
The results o f the current experiment did not provide significant evidence for my
predictions. It is possible that this lack of support is due to flaws in my hypotheses. In
particular, as Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999) have noted, it is not currently known how
specific (or broad) any one domain of self-esteem might be. Although both Kirkpatrick
and Ellis and results from data that I have previously collected suggest that mateselection and coalitional self-esteem may represent two domains of self-esteem, this may
not be the case. These conceptualizations of domains may be too broad (e.g. Kirkpatrick
and Ellis have suggested that a competitive domain may be so specific as to be
selectively attentive to information regarding physical attractiveness). These
conceptualizations may also be too narrow (i.e. it may be possible that there are only two
domain-specific sociometers, those for competitive and cooperative relationships).
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Despite these possibilities, I posit that the lack of support for the current hypotheses
may be, to a greater degree, due to issues in the current experiment that were important
enough to have seriously affected the current results.
Potential Problems with the Current Experiment
Self-Esteem Assessment
Out of all possible issues that could have seriously affected the results of the
current experiment, I presume that the means by which self-esteem was assessed may
have been the most serious. In particular, I think that the scales that were employed,
which assessed self-esteem via explicit responses that were provided by participants, are
inherently unable to effectively assess any self-esteem injury that participants may have
incurred, regardless of the domain in which that injury may have happened.
Implicit self-esteem. Previous research has supported this position, suggesting
that more direct methods of self-esteem measurement may not be exceptionally effective
at accurately measuring self-esteem (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Ziller et al., 1969).
Greenwald and Banaji believe that this is because much of social behavior, including
self-esteem, functions implicitly. Implicit self-esteem is “the introspectively unidentified
effect of the self-attitude on evaluation o f self-associated or self-disassociated objects”
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Because this implicit self-esteem can not be assessed using
explicit measures, Greenwald and Banaji suggest that the best assessment of self-esteem
would entail the use of an implicit measure. Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998)
have created such an implicit measurement system referred to as the Implicit Association
Test (IAT). Greenwald et al. hypothesize that this computer-based measurement can be
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utilized to measure virtually any implicit association, including self-esteem (W.
Cunningham, personal communication, December 1997).
Realizing that the current experiment may be affected by the purported
inaccuracies of explicit measurement of self-esteem, I previously conducted two studies
in order to assess two different methods by which to implicitly assess both global and
domain-specific self-esteem. In the first of these studies, an IAT constructed by
Greenwald was utilized (W. Cunningham, personal communication, March 1998) to
assess global self-esteem. In addition to this global self-esteem IAT, I also created a
mate-selection IAT and a coalitional IAT. Unfortunately, the results of this study
suggested that none of these LATs were good measures of the self-esteem that they were
created to assess (Williams, 1998).
In a second attempt to construct an implicit measure o f self-esteem, I recently ran
a second study (Williams & Kirkpatrick, 1998). This study was based upon results found
by Nezlek and Gable (1998) that suggest that response latency is directly related to self
esteem. In particular, they hypothesize that response latencies to self-esteem items
decrease as self-esteem increases. With these results in mind, I created a computer
program that assessed both one’s responses and response latencies to explicit self-esteem
items. Mate-selection self-esteem items, coalitional self-esteem items, and global self
esteem items were included (the global self-esteem items came from the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale). The results o f this study indicated small, yet significant, negative
relationships between the explicit responses to the coalitional self-esteem scale and its
response latencies (r = -.27, p < .01) and between the explicit responses to the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem Scale and its response latencies (r = -.35, p < .01). Significant relationships,
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however, were not found between response latencies and explicit responses for any of
the mate-selection items. Due to these findings, I decided that this method by which to
implicitly assess self-esteem was not more effective than explicit assessment. Because
neither o f these two studies produced results that suggested that these means o f assessing
implicit self-esteem were more effective than explicit measurement, I decided to employ
explicit measures in the current experiment.
Other disadvantages o f explicit assessment. In addition to the advantage of more
accurately assessing self-esteem, utilizing implicit measures might also have controlled
for two potential confounds. To begin with, an implicit measurement would have
controlled for any desire a participant might have had to misrepresent his self-esteem by
consciously choosing to not answer the explicit self-esteem questions truthfully. This
would be true because, by definition, one who is completing an implicit measure should
not be able to consciously adjust one’s implicit reactions or responses. Second, an
implicit measure would have concealed the design of the current experiment. The nature
o f this experiment was such that participant knowledge o f the purpose of the experiment
could have confounded the results, insomuch that this knowledge could have served to
buffer any self-esteem injury or otherwise caused participants to respond differently.
Thus, if the self-esteem assessment were implicit, it would be much less likely that one
might be able to discern that which the experiment was designed to examine. Even
though these two confounds appear to be similar, it is possible that one could have had a
reason to misrepresent his self-esteem that did not relate to knowledge o f the purposes of
the experiment.
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Because the current experiment employed the use of explicit measures of self
esteem, however, it is more likely that participants could have become aware of the true
purposes or could have become suspicious of the purported purposes of the current
experiment. In order to reduce this possibility, the experimenters stressed that the self
esteem scales were for a different study, an assertion that was strengthened by the fact
that these scales were included in a computer program, a medium of presentation that was
novel relative to the other means of assessment utilized in the current experiment. Despite
these attempts, although no participants indicated that they understood the real motives of
the experiment upon witnessing the explicit self-esteem scales, many did indicate that the
self-referent nature of the questions in the computer program led them to be mildly
suspicious that the computer task was actually part o f the current experiment. According
to these participants, this belief further led them to be mildly suspicious of the design of
the current experiment as a whole.
Because many participants indicated that they had become mildly suspicious of
the nature o f the current experiment upon witnessing the self-esteem scales, the manner
in which they responded to the scales may have been affected. In particular, this
suspicion may have caused them to be more aware o f their responses and to therefore
perhaps filter how they presented themselves. In addition, increased suspicion may have
had the effect o f weakening the impact o f the perceived rejection.
Problems with the mate-selection self-esteem scale. Although past studies have
suggested that the measure o f mate-selection self-esteem that was employed in the
current experiment is a good measure o f mate-selection self-esteem, it nonetheless may
not have been sensitive enough to have accurately assessed the impact o f the perceived
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mate-selection rejection. This may be because many of the items in the mate-selection
self-esteem scale referred to past events. One such item is: “I find that, after I go out on a
date with someone o f the opposite sex, that person wants to go out with me on a second
date.” Another o f these items is: “I do not regularly ‘date’ or ‘see’ people of the opposite
sex.” Although I had thought, prior to the current experiment, that participants’ responses
to self-esteem items of this nature may not be affected by a perceived rejection, I also
thought that participants’ memory of such events may be affected by the perceived
rejection, and that this effect might lead them to respond to items of this nature in a
different manner. This, however, may have not been the case. Because many of the mateselection self-esteem items referred to past events, the responses that participants
provided for them may not have been affected by the perceived mate-selection rejection.
The mate-selection self-esteem scale, therefore, may not have been sensitive enough to
have accurately assessed the impact of the perceived mate-selection rejection.
Affirmation
Another issue that may have significantly contributed to the results of the current
experiment regards the nature of the participants’ affirmations. For those who affirmed in
mate-selection, each o f the possible mate characteristics was chosen at least once by
participants as their most valued mate characteristic. For those who affirmed in the
coalitional domain, five out of the possible six types o f coalitions were chosen at least
once by participants as their most valued coalition. For both types o f coalitions and mateselection characteristics, however, participants’ choices were not evenly distributed
among the chosen categories (see Table

6

for frequencies). For those who affirmed in

mate-selection, 14 of 28 affirmations were for the characteristic “kind and considerate.”
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For those who affirmed in the coalitional domain, 21 of 30 affirmations were for the
“family” coalition.
Reasons why the affirmation may not have had a significant effect. The
affirmation may not have been found to significantly affect self-esteem primarily due to
the fact that the design o f the current experiment was different from the successful design
o f Tesser and Cornell (1991). First, Tesser and Cornell utilized Allport-Vemon interest
categories as the basis for their affirmation manipulation. All affirmations in the current
experiment were based upon mate-selection characteristics and coalitional types, the
wording and description of which I created. This may have been a significant issue for a
few reasons. To begin with, the Allport-Vemon interest categories may possess
characteristics that are more conducive to successful affirmation. For example, the
Allport-Vemon interest categories are more ambiguous and abstract, whereas the mateselection characteristics and coalition types that I employed are very specific. The more
abstract nature of the Allport-Vemon interest categories may have increased the positive
effects of the affirmation because they may have, individually, affected multiple domains
of self-esteem. The mate-selection characteristics and coalitional types that I employed,
however, were specifically created to not affect multiple domains o f self-esteem. Second,
the variance in the degree to which participants valued each of the Allport-Vemon
interest categories may have been greater than that for the mate-selection characteristics
and coalition types that I utilized. This increased variance may have allowed participants
to identify one interest category that was o f significantly greater personal importance,
relative to the other possible selections. As previously addressed, in the current
experiment, I assumed that most participants would find, for both mate-selection and
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coalitions, all six statements to be of similar personal value. I had presumed, however,
that participants would nonetheless be able to choose one statement, for both mateselection and coalitions, that was highly valued. This may not have been the case.
Another reason why the affirmation may not have significantly affected self
esteem may be that participants were able to indicate their most valued selection, but, for
some reason, made a selection of lesser value. For example, even though I assumed that,
for college students, resource potential might be more predictive of mate-value than
resource possession, it was nonetheless surprising that only one person (who affirmed in
mate-selection) chose resource possession as their most valued characteristic. This
finding might indicate that the resource possession statement and paragraph were not
worded in such a manner as to not appear narcissistic or socially undesirable. There may
have been more persons for whom this was most valued, but they may have been
dissuaded from selecting it because o f the wording that was chosen for its description.
Therefore, the wording that was chosen for all of the statements and paragraphs, for both
mate-selection characteristics and coalition types, may have led participants to not choose
a statement that was in fact their most valued.
Reasons why the affirmation did not have the effect that I hypothesized. The
statements that participants chose as their most valued mate characteristic and coalition
are important, given the probable overlap between the mate-selection and coalitional
domains. Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999), in the context of discussing possible specificity
and subsequent hierarchy o f potential sociometers, address the issue o f domain
intercorrelation. In particular, they mention that some kinds o f information, which affect
one’s perceived value in one domain, may affect one’s perceived value in another
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domain. One example that they indicate is that of “kindness and trustworthiness,”
which they hypothesize might be both valued by potential mates and coalition partners.
This is an important issue, given that half of the mate-selection affirmations were for the
characteristic kind and considerate. In addition to this characteristic, the other top mate
characteristic choices, “hard working and ambitious” and “intelligence,” could also be
seen as being highly prized in mates as well as coalition partners. Therefore, 24 of 28
mate-selection affirmations may have had enough overlap with the coalitional domain to
have not specifically affected mate-selection self-esteem.
This view o f this particular domain overlap is echoed in a discussion of mateselection (Buss, 1992). Buss hypothesizes that, in many ways, a mating relationship is
similar to a two-person coalition. Specifically, he argues that a mating pair are essentially
cooperating for a shared goal, successful reproduction and proliferation of offspring, and
that their success is dependent upon the success o f their cooperation. Buss would
hypothesize, therefore, that, in addition to being competitive, as suggested by Kirkpatrick
and Ellis (1999), mate-selection has a strong coalitional component, in which partners are
chosen on the basis of their coalitional traits and potential cooperative compatibility.
From this perspective, kindness, in a mate-selection context, might not just be
representative of a male’s willingness to impart resources, but might also relate to this
potential mating coalition.
Notwithstanding this overlap, it is difficult to interpret the barely-significant main
effect o f coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, especially given that the
majority o f those who had a coalitional affirmation chose to affirm with the family
coalition. It is possible, however, that an affirmation for the family coalition cued
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memories and thoughts relating to how kind and considerate one had been to his
family. Also, one would assume that a person who would choose family as his most
valued coalition is likely to agree with and enjoy his family, so it is possible that his
family had approved of and encouraged past dating relationships. As I have previously
mentioned, however, it is also likely that this main effect was significant just due to
chance.
Characteristics of the Sample
Sample size. A problem that may have seriously affected the results that were
found was the size of the sample upon which analyses were conducted. As previously
mentioned, the criteria that I had assumed would be important to the design of the current
experiment limited the number of potential participants. In addition, a number of
participants served as pilot participants, and the data for other participants were removed
due to their dating status or comments that they made during debriefing. After the data
for these participants had been removed, I was left with a final sample size of 59, which
was divided among cells thusly: affirmation in both mate-selection and coalitional, n =
14, affirmation in mate-selection, n —14, affirmation in coalitional, n = 16, no
affirmation, n = 15.
The negative effects of this small sample size can be seen in calculations of the
observed power of the analyses employed for this experiment. For the two-way analyses,
the observed power o f the tests of main effects and interactions for all dependent
measures ranged from 0.05 to 0.51. The observed power o f the significant main effect of
coalitional affirmation on mate-selection self-esteem, which was contrary to my
predictions, was 0.51. This indicates that, if the effect size demonstrated in my sample
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were reflective of the actual effect in the population, I would have about a 50% chance
o f finding it. The observed power of the three-way analyses that were employed in the
current experiment was also limited. For the three-way analysis comparing the mateselection self-esteem scale with the coalitional self-esteem scale, observed power for the
main effects and interactions ranged from 0.05 to 0.42. For the three-way analysis
comparing the mate-selection self-esteem scale with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale,
observed power for the main effects and interactions ranged from 0.05 to 0.46. My
relatively small sample size, therefore, may have limited the statistical power of the
analyses that were employed to find effects of the independent variables.
Possibility o f selection bias. It is possible that certain characteristics of the sample
used in the current experiment may have introduced biases that would limit the
generalizability o f any results or trends that were demonstrated. To begin with, the final
sample only contained data from participants that were not in a heterosexual dating
relationship. This characteristic of the sample may have led participants to have lower
mate-selection self-esteem, even before the onset of the current experiment.
In order to examine this possibility, data collected roughly two months prior to the
onset o f the current experiment, via a mass-testing procedure, were analyzed (Williams &
Kirkpatrick, 1998). All potential research participants, including those in the current
experiment, had been required to complete a mass-testing questionnaire, which contained
the mate-selection self-esteem scale. The mean mate-selection self-esteem, as assessed
during this mass-testing procedure, of the 59 participants who participated in the current
experiment was compared to the mean mate-selection self-esteem of those who did not
participate. The first of these analyses revealed that the mate-selection self-esteem of
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those in the current experiment was significantly lower than that of persons who did
not participate, t(472) = 2.14, p < .05. In addition, these analyses revealed that the mateselection self-esteem of those in the current experiment was also significantly lower than
that of males who did not participate, t(175) = 3.42, p < .01. The first of these results,
which compared the current participants with all others who did not participate, reflects a
moderate-sized effect, d = 0.32. The second, and more important analysis, which
compared the current participants (who were all male) to males who did not participate in
the current experiment, reflected a larger effect, d = 0.56. These sizeable effects,
especially for that of the second analysis, suggest that the dating status of those in the ,
current experiment may have introduced a bias that led to the current sample having
lower than average mate-selection self-esteem.
Another characteristic that may limit the generalizability of the results of the
current experiment is the age of those who participated. All participants were college
students ranging in age from 18 to 22 years. As previously mentioned, Buss (1994)
believes that females are likely to use resource potential (i.e. ambitiousness and hard
work) as an estimate of future resource possession when a male is too young to have
acquired very many resources. However, it may be possible that the younger males who
participated in the current experiment had yet to learn that resource potential was a
desired mate characteristic. If this were true, participants may not have chosen “hard
work and ambitiousness” as their most valued mate characteristic, despite that they may
in fact have possessed those very traits. Therefore, using an older sample may have
avoided this potential problem.
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Other Problems
An additional problem may have been the effect of the perceived rejection upon
mate-selection self-esteem. I had assumed that the design of the current experiment was
such that mate-selection self-esteem would be primarily affected by the rejection, as I
thought that participants would view the rejection in a mate-selection context. Although
many participants indicated in debriefing that they felt more affected by the rejection
because they thought that “Participant C” was female, it may not have been salient
enough to have seriously impacted their mate-selection self-esteem. The salience of this
perceived rejection occurring in a mate-selection context may have been increased with
specific alterations to the current design. For example, the possibility o f affecting mateselection self-esteem may have been increased if there actually was a sexually attractive,
female Participant C. If both participants had met this female, the perceived mateselection competition may have been more salient, and the perceived rejection may have
been more likely to have affected mate-selection self-esteem.
Future Directions
Although analyses of the dependent variables did not indicate that the participants
were affected in the ways in which I hypothesized, it must be stressed that, in postexperimental interviews, participants emphasized the effectiveness of the perceived
rejection. In almost all cases, participants indicated that they had believed that
“Participant C” really existed, and that Participant C had made the decision not to
participate with them (the data for participants who did not make this indication were
dropped from my analyses). Many participants indicated that this belief was most
affected by the five-minute oral-response that they had made to this purported third
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participant. In addition, many participants also indicated that they had felt “rejected” or
“disappointed” that they had not been selected. In many of these cases, participants
indicated that this disappointment was due to their perception that Participant C was
female and could see them during the experiment through a two-way mirror.
I hypothesize that a more accurate method by which to assess this effect, besides
assessing implicit self-esteem, could involve coding practices. First, after participants are
informed that Participant C did not choose to participate with them, maybe participants
could be placed in some type o f scenario in which they interacted with a novel person(s)
of the opposite sex. This interaction might also occur in the context o f other same-sex
persons being available to interact with those same persons of the opposite sex. One
might then code for submissive behaviors or avoidance o f interaction with persons of the
opposite sex. In addition to this condition, other participants who had been rejected by a
perceived opposite sex person might be placed in an interaction scenario with only others
o f the same sex, and these same behaviors might be recorded and compared with those
persons interacting with opposite sex persons.
Second, another method might entail having participants write about a topic after
they are informed that they have not been chosen. Rather than having participants write
about specific topics, possibly one could ask them to write about their most salient dating
experiences, or write about future dating experiences. After participants had written their
responses, the responses could be coded for themes such as rejection and pessimism. In
contrast to these writing exercises, other participants might be asked to write about
significant memories or future predictions of behavior that do not deal with mateselection. Therefore, based upon the responses of participants in the current experiment, a
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more effective method might be used to assess self-esteem without significantly
changing the rejection paradigm. I hypothesize that such a method might entail a few
different approaches, all of which would be constructed so as to keep the participants
from realizing the nature of the experiment or the assessment.
Aspects of the Self-Concept
Some important issues for research investigating self-esteem or self-evaluation
deal with one’s self-concepts. One’s self-concepts are thought to be composed of one’s
self-aspects or self-attributes, each of which represents one’s knowledge of the self as
represented by cognitive structures (Baumgardner, 1990; Linville, 1987). It has been
suggested that self-concepts are a critical part of both one’s affective and cognitive
system (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Due to their personal importance, research has suggested
relationships between one’s self-concepts and numerous personality variables, most
notably self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 1996;
Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992).
It has been suggested that one essentially has two independent types of investment
in one’s self-concepts: clarity and importance (Pelham, 1991). O f these two types of
investment, the literature has suggested the strongest relationships between self-concept
clarity and global self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al.,
1996). According to Baumgardner (1990), self-concept clarity is concerned with one’s
knowledge o f whether one has a variety of trait attributes and, if present, the degree to
which these trait attributes are possessed. The literature has suggested that lower levels of
self-concept clarity are associated with lower global self-esteem (Baumgardner, 1990;
Campbell, 1990; Campbell et al., 1996). It is thought that this relationship may be due to
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the increased perception of control over future events that is thought to accompany
high self-concept clarity, thus propagating positive affect and increased global self
esteem (Baumgardner, 1990). Because, conversely, it is thought that lower self-concept
clarity is accompanied by a decreased sense of control over future events, it has been
further hypothesized that people with lower self-concept clarity are therefore more
influenced by external, self-relevant stimuli (Campbell, 1990).
In addition to self-concept clarity, self-concept complexity has also been
investigated (Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992). Self-concept complexity has been
operationalized as the number of self-aspects one possesses and the distinctions amongst
these aspects (Linville, 1987; Showers, 1992). As with self-concept clarity, self-concept
complexity has also been suggested to be related to global self-esteem. Linville (1987)
has suggested that self-concept complexity acts as a moderator of the effects of stress,
and increased self-concept complexity makes one less susceptible to depression and other
stress-related symptoms. This is thought to occur due to the increased number of self
aspects possessed by one with increased self-concept complexity. Therefore, if a self
aspect is negatively affected, one with an increased number o f self-aspects has a buffer
against that negative effect, because the affected self-aspect composes a smaller
proportion of one’s total self (Linville, 1987).
This view is mirrored by work done by Showers (1992), who refers to the
compartmentalization of one’s self-aspects. Compartmentalization is similar to
complexity in that one who has increased compartmentalization of self-aspects has a
greater organization o f one’s self-knowledge. It has been suggested that increased levels
of this organization can aid one in protecting oneself from negative self-information.
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Both self-concept complexity and compartmentalization, therefore, have been
suggested to engender one with a defense against negative self-information, protecting
one’s overall view of the self.
Self-concept research suggests that characteristics of one’s self-concepts may
affect the impact of negative self-referent information upon one’s self-esteem. Due to
random assignment into conditions, however, it is unlikely that self-concept clarity,
complexity, or compartmentalization significantly affected the results of the current
experiment. It is possible, nonetheless, that these characteristics o f the self-concept may
have diluted any effects that may have been present. It would be interesting, for future
research, to use the degree to which one possesses various self-concept characteristics
(i.e. low-high) as an independent variable in order to more directly observe the effects of
these characteristics.
O f particular interest, for future extension of the current experiment, are selfconcept complexity and compartmentalization. It appears that these two attributes of the
self-concept may be related to the hypotheses of domain-specificity posited by
Kirkpatrick and Ellis (1999). Specifically, the conceptualization o f one possessing
multiple, compartmentalized self-concepts appears to be akin to Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s
hypotheses of multiple domains of self-esteem. Incorporating hypotheses of self-concept
complexity and compartmentalization into future domain-specific self-esteem research,
therefore, may further illuminate the functioning of self-esteem. For example, Kirkpatrick
and Ellis have hypothesized that there may be two varieties of self-esteem, those for
competitive and those for cooperative relationships. It might be possible that people
differ in the degree to which their competitive self-concepts and cooperative self
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concepts are both complex and compartmentalized. Possibly, if someone were to have
a large number of both competitive and cooperative self-concepts (i.e. very complex), it
might be more likely that there would be more crossover of self-concepts between the
competitive and cooperative domains. Due to this increased crossover, one may be able
to offset a self-evaluative injury by affirming in a domain other than the injured domain.
This, however, might not be true for one with lower self-concept complexity, who may
therefore have fewer crossovers between domains. The apparent similarities between
self-concept complexity and compartmentalization with domain-specific hypotheses of
self-esteem, therefore, may afford more accurate hypotheses regarding the functioning of
self-esteem.
Conclusions
I designed this experiment in an attempt to provide some empirical evidence for
Kirkpatrick and Ellis’s (1999) hypotheses regarding the domain-specific nature of self
esteem. Unfortunately, the data did not support my predictions. Nonetheless, important
issues were present in my experiment that may have seriously affected the nature of the
results. Once these issues are addressed, I feel that the fundamental paradigm of my
experiment has the potential to demonstrate support for the current hypotheses. I am
confident in the foundation upon which the hypotheses presented by Kirkpatrick and Ellis
(1999) have been based, and posit that these hypotheses have the potential to offer new
and exciting insight into self-esteem processes.
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Footnotes
le s s e r and Cornell (1991) do not explicitly state that they did not control for this
possibility. They do not, however, mention that it was considered. I have inferred that
they did not control for this possibility by comparing the interest categories from which
the high and low self-relevance domains were chosen (for each participant) with the
domain that may have been affected by the perceived superior performance of another.
To begin with, one can infer from the high relevance condition that the affected domain is
likely to have something to do with intelligence (the domain associated with the low
relevance condition is much less apparent). One of the possible interest categories that
participants may have indicated to be of the highest self-relevance was called “The
Theoretical.” The description offered for this interest category led me to postulate that it
also was related to intelligence (see page 28 for a verbatim description of this category).
Because Tesser and Cornell included an interest category, which participants could have
chosen as their highest self-relevant interest, that was in the same domain as that which
was affected by the self-evaluative injury, I have assumed that they did not control for the
potential similarity of the two domains.
2This process was especially difficult for the resource possession characteristic, as
I thought that, as originally worded, it had narcissistic overtones and might not be chosen
to be a participant’s most valued characteristic, even if this were the case. I thought that
using the statement “I value that I have the means to purchase what I want” to represent
the resource possession characteristic retained an accurate depiction o f the characteristic,
yet presented it in a way that it would not appear to be unappealing to those who valued
this characteristic.
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Table 1
Correlations Among Dependent Variables

Scale

1

2

3

.55**

.48**

—

.6 6 **

4

(n = 59)
1. Mate-selection SE
2. Coalitional SE
3. Rosenberg SE

—

44

**

.63**
yi**

4. Self-concept clarity
Note. Mate-selection SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; Coalitional SE = Coalitional
self-esteem scale; Rosenberg SE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965); Self-concept
clarity = Self-Concept Clarity Scale (1996).
** p <

0 .0 1

(2 -tailed).
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Table 2
Mean Scale Scores for Affirmation Conditions

Scale

Condition

n

M

Mate-selection SE

Mate-selection affirmation - No
Coalitional affirmation - No

15

2.80 (SD = 0.47)

Coalitional affirmation -Y es

16

3.13 (SD = 0.53)

Coalitional affirmation - No

14

3.07 (SD = 0.86)

Coalitional affirmation - Yes

14

3.38 (SD = 0.55)

Coalitional affirmation - No

15

3.68 (SD = 0.52)

Coalitional affirmation -Y es

16

3.84 (SD = 0.59)

Coalitional affirmation - No

14

3.70 (SD = 0.54)

Coalitional affirmation - Yes

14

3.88 (SD = 0.60)

Mate-selection affirmation - Yes

Coalitional SE

Mate-selection affirmation - No

Mate-selection affirmation - Yes

Note. All scores fell within a range o f 1 to 5. Higher scores are indicative o f higher self
esteem. SE = Self-esteem.
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Table 3
Mean Scale Scores for Affirmation Conditions (Continued)

Scale

Condition

n

M

Rosenberg SE

Mate-selection affirmation - No
Coalitional affirmation - No

15

3.87 (SD = 0.56)

Coalitional affirmation -Yes

16

3.82 (SD = 0.62)

Coalitional affirmation - No

14

4.01 (SD = 0.66)

Coalitional affirmation - Yes

14

4.08 (SD = 0.71)

Coalitional affirmation - No

15

3.00 (SD = 0.76)

Coalitional affirmation -Y es

16

3.30 (SD = 0.61)

Coalitional affirmation - No

14

3.34 (SD = 0.75)

Coalitional affirmation - Yes

14

3.43 (SD = 0.68)

Mate-selection affirmation - Yes

Self-concept clarity

Mate-selection affirmation - No

Mate-selection affirmation - Yes

Note. All scores fell within a range of 1 to 5. Higher scores are indicative of higher self
esteem or higher self-concept clarity, respectively. SE = Self-esteem.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance for the Mate-Selection and Coalitional Self-Esteem Scales

Source

df

SS

MS

F

E

Between subjects
Mate-selection affirmation (MSA)

1

0.61

0.61

1.13

.29

Coalitional affirmation (CA)

1

1.73

1.73

3.21

.08

MSA x CA

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

Error

55

29.66

0.54

Within subjects
Scale (MS SE & C SE)

1

13.66

13.66

86.19

.00

Scale x MSA

1

0.39

0.39

2.43

.12

Scale x CA

1

0.19

0.19

1.20

.28

Scale x MSA x CA

1

0.00

0.00

0.01

.92

Error (Scale)

55

8.72

0.16

Note. MS SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; C SE = Coalitional self-esteem scale; a
= .05.
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance for the Mate-Selection and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scales

Source

df

SS

MS

F

E

Between subjects
Mate-selection affirmation (MSA)

1

1.52

1.52

2.63

.11

Coalitional affirmation (CA)

1

0.81

0.81

1.40

.24

MSA x CA

1

0.02

0.02

0.04

.84

Error

55

31.85

0.58

Within subjects
Scale (MS SE & R SE)

1

21.27

21.27

103.59

.00

Scale x MSA

1

0.03

0.03

0.14

.71

Scale x CA

1

0.73

0.73

3.55

.07

Scale x MSA x CA

1

0.04

0.04

0.18

.67

Error (Scale)

55

11.29

0.20

Note. MS SE = Mate-selection self-esteem scale; R SE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(1965); a = .05.
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Table 6
Frequencies of Most Valued Mate-Selection Characteristics and Coalition Types

Most valued selection

f

Mate-selection
Kind and considerate

Most valued selection

f

Coalitional
14

Family

21

Hard working and ambitious

7

Religion

4

Intelligence

3

Clubs and organizations

2

Physical attractiveness

2

Same-sex friends

2

Athleticism

1

U. S. citizenship

1

Resource possession

1

Note. Resource possession is used to represent the statement: “I value that I have
the means to purchase what I want.” Frequencies are presented in descending order.
Selections depicted only represent choices for those participants who affirmed
themselves.
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Appendix A
Mate-Selection Self-Esteem Scale (T2-Item)
1. I sometimes wish I were more physically attractive.
2. Members of the opposite sex seem to like me.
3.

, I feel as if no one o f the opposite sex is 'out of my league'.

4.

It surprises me when someone of the opposite sex shows interest inme.

5. I feel that the chances that I would date one of the most popular persons of the
opposite sex on campus are very good.
6. In a social situation, I often find that persons of the opposite sex seem to act as if I'm
not even there.
7.

I find that, after I go out on a date with someone of the oppositesex, that person
wants to go out with me on a second date.

8. I do not find it easy to meet people o f the opposite sex.
9. I often get compliments from people of the opposite sex, even when I don't think that
I look especially good.
10.1 do not regularly 'date' or 'see' people of the opposite sex.
11. When I start a conversation with someone o f the opposite sex whom I do not know,
that person usually seems eager to talk to me.
1 2 .1 often worry about what people of the opposite sex think about me.
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Appendix B
Coalitional Self-Esteem Scale
1. My partners on group projects believe that I have much to offer.
2. If I could find a fraternity or sorority that I wanted to be a part of, I doubt that I could
get in.
3. I enjoy being involved in clubs, sports teams, or other organizations.
4. I often feel like it is me against the world.
5. When people I know do things as a group, I get invited to come along.
6. I often feel kind of'left out'.
7. When I go somewhere new, it doesn't take me long to develop a close-knit circle of
friends.
8. I don't really feel very much a part of things here at college.
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Appendix C
Mate-Selection Statements and Paragraphs
Please read the following underlined statements and their accompanying paragraphs. When you
have finished, please order the six underlined statements by personal value by writing the number
o f the appropriate statement in the space near the desired order, where: 1st = most valued and 6th =
least valued.
You will probably find that you strongly agree with many o f these statements, and that it is, in
many cases, extremely difficult to rank one above the other. It is understood that just because you
rank a categoiy below others does not mean you disagree with the statement or do not highly value
what it describes.
Statement ranking:
| s t.

2 nd-

3 rd*

4 * .

^ th .

^ th .

1.

I value mv physical attractiveness. Physical attractiveness refers to the degree to which someone else
finds one's external, visible traits attractive or appealing. The quality o f any or all o f the following
traits are often considered when assessing physical attractiveness: face, hair, complexion, muscular
build, height, and overall appearance (i.e. well dressed, well kept). For people who are physically
attractive, these traits are o f high quality; these people, therefore, regularly receive compliments or
feedback from others regarding their attractive appearance.

2.

I value mv athleticism. People who are athletic have impressive physical skills and abilities. Because
o f these skills, such people usually excel in sports or other competitive physical activities and are
therefore often recognized for their excellence. Due to their ability, athletic people seek out and enjoy
participation in sports or other competitive physical activities.

3.

I value mv intelligence. Intelligence refers to the degree to which one is able to solve problems and
learn and understand complex or new material. People who are considered intelligent enjoy being
involved in activities or professions that allow them to utilize and demonstrate their impressive
thinking ability. These persons often receive high grades in school and/or are recognized in some
fashion for superior knowledge or mental performance.

4.

I value that I have the means to purchase what I want. Those who have the means to purchase what
they want usually do not see cost as a barrier. Because o f this, such people often own and get to do lots
o f really cool things. The things that they own are often highly desirable and expensive, and may
include items such as cars, motorcycles, stereos, and other types o f interesting equipment. These
people may also easily afford to do things such as attending concerts, eating out at restaurants, and
traveling to other places.

5.

I value that I am kind and considerate. Considerateness refers to the degree to which one demonstrates
concern for the feelings o f another person. Considerate people are thoughtful and think o f other people
in addition to themselves. Such persons care about what happens to others, and often risk personal loss
or incur personal expense in order to secure good fortune for another.

6.

I value that I am ambitious and hard working. Someone who is ambitious and hard working has plans
for the future. In particular, such a person believes that effort expended in the present will lead to
future accomplishments. One may not see immediate results o f such effort, but often the
accomplishments one eventually receives are extremely beneficial.
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Appendix D
Coalitional Statements and Paragraphs
Please read the following underlined statements and their accompanying paragraphs. When you have
finished, please order the six underlined statements by personal value by writing the number of the
appropriate statement in the space near the desired order, where: 1st = most valued and 6th = least
valued.
You will probably find that you strongly agree with many o f these statements, and that it is, in many
cases, extremely difficult to rank one above the other. It is understood that just because you rank a
category below others does not mean you disagree with the statement or do not highly value what it
describes.
Statement ranking:
I st.

2 nd-

3 rd-

4 dl>

5 th-

1.

I value mv same-sex friendships. Friendship refers to the interpersonal relationships one has with other
persons of the same sex (non-relatives). Someone who has a friendship has more than just an acquaintance.
In particular, friends not only tend to spend time with each other, but they also support each other’s goals
and causes. Due to the nature of this relationship, friends often feel a strong bond between them.

2.

I value the clubs and organizations in which I am involved. ‘Clubs’ and ‘organizations’ are two broad
descriptors that may include many different specific examples, such as fraternities or sororities (but not sport
teams). Despite their potential diversity, these specific examples do, however, share some common
characteristics. In particular, ‘clubs’ and ‘organizations’ are composed o f groups o f people, were created for
some common purpose or interest, and usually require that a potential member in some way ‘join’ the group.

3.

I value mv ethnic heritage. Ethnic heritage is a term that refers to one’s race or ancestral background, yet not
always to a specific nationality. It is assumed that, by using this definition, everyone has an ethnic heritage.
People o f different ethnic heritages usually have their own specific customs and practices. These ways are
usually highly prized and are often recognized only by those o f the same ethnic heritage. Because of their
unique characteristics, people of the same ethnic heritage often feel a common attachment among them.

4.

I value mv family. Most people are raised as part of a family, which is typically composed of relatives such
as parents, siblings, grandparents, and aunts and uncles. In many cases, however, one’s family may consist
o f people to whom one is not related. Regardless of their nature, families are usually very supportive and
loving. There is often a strong bond among family members, and people therefore usually feel very secure
with their family around. Because o f these emotions, people often go out of their way to be in contact with
their family.

5.

I value being a citizen of the United States. Those who value their U.S. citizenship feel great pride in their
country. They usually cannot imagine living anywhere else, and find pleasure in their personal freedom and
all that is distinctly ‘American.’ All things considered, therefore, these types of people feel that the U.S. is
the best country in which to live and be a citizen.

6.

I value mv religious group. Many people are part of or participate in the activities o f a given religious group.
Religions can be very diverse and numerous, but nonetheless tend to focus around some central faith or
method o f worship. Religious people often receive spiritual satisfaction and pleasure from practicing their
religion, and usually do so within a community of other believers. Those who value their religious group,
therefore, enjoy the personal enlightenment and social unity that their religion has to offer.
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Appendix E
Items Relating to Mate-Value Characteristics
Appendix E 1. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my physical
attractiveness.”
Appendix E2. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my athleticism.”
Appendix E3. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my intelligence.”
Appendix E4. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I have the
means to purchase what I want.”
Appendix E5. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I am kind and
considerate.”
Appendix E6. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value that I am ambitious
and hard working.”
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Appendix E 1
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree , 2 = disagree , 3 = neither, 4
= agree , and 5= strongly agree.

I often get compliments on my physical appearance.................................. 1......2........3...... 4......5
Attractive people simply have more opportunities
than other people.

1......2........3...... 4......5

People are often impressed by my good looks.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

Ultimately, it all comes down to one’s physical appearance.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

I often catch people admiring the way that I look.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

If two people of equal qualifications applied for the same job,
it is more likely that the better looking of the two will get the job.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

The fact that I am good-looking leads others to have
a better opinion of me.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

Good-looking people, overall, usually have
better qualities than others.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

My physical appearance has gained me popularity.

1......2........3...... 4..... 5

All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my physical appearance.

1....... 2.......3......4...... 5

MS/PA
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Appendix E2
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree , and 5= strongly agree.

I feel an incredible sense of accomplishment when I surpass
someone else in a competitive physical activity.........................................1.......2...... 3...... 4.......5
Developing one’s physical abilities is just as important
as developing one’s intellect.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

Athletic people, overall, usually have better qualities than others.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

Demonstrating my physical skills can lead others
to have a better opinion of me.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

I would most prefer to spend my leisure time participating
in competitive physical activity.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

There are few things more pleasurable than
winning a sporting event.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

I feel that my athletic skill is better than
that of the average athlete.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

When playing as part of a team, my teammates often look
to me to make major contributions towards winning.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

When I try a new sport or physical activity, I can
usually excel at it quite quickly.

1.......2...... 3.......4..... 5

All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my physical ability.

1.......2...... 3.......4.....5

MS/A
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Appendix E3
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

When having a discussion with my same-sex friends, I often
find that I am most interested in discussing topics that
are deep and require a lot of thought..........................................................1.......2...... 3...... 4.......5
It feels good to know a professor is impressed
with my thinking ability.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Demonstrating my intellectual ability often leads others
to have a better opinion of me.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Smart and creative people compose the foundation
of society’s greatest achievements.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

The grades that one receives in school are a good
indicator of one’s overall worth.

1

...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

If two people applied for the same job, all other things
being equal, the applicant with the highest grades
and/or test scores should get the job.

1.......2...... 3...... 4...... 5

I generally enjoy learning new and exciting topics.

1.......2...... 3......4...... 5

All things being equal, I am most pleased when I am
recognized for my intelligence.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

Nothing is quite as gratifying as solving some
complex or challenging problem.

1.......2...... 3...... 4...... 5

It’s enjoyable to have an intellectual argument with someone
and to have therefore changed the way that theylook at a topic.

1.......2...... 3......4......5

MS/I
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Appendix E4
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

I like the way it feels when I buy new and interesting things.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

If I were really rich, I would truly be a part of the world’s elite.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

I’m glad that, if I want to do something cool or interesting, I
don’t have to be concerned with how much it costs................................... 1.......2...... 3...... 4...... 5
Some of my more pleasurable feelings involve my possession
of expensive items and other things.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Spending money often leads others to have a better opinion of me.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

I feel that the quality of one’s possessions serves as a more
accurate measure of one’s personal worth.

1.......2...... 3...... 4...... 5

The only good jobs are those that pay really well.

1.......2...... 3...... 4......5

People are impressed by the things that I own.

1.......2...... 3...... 4......5

It’s reassuring to know that, if I so desired, I could
afford the expense of travel.

1.......2...... 3...... 4......5

Wealthy people compose the foundation of
society’s greatest achievements.

1.......2...... 3......4......5

MS/RP
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Appendix E5
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

It often feels good to put someone else’s interests before myown.............. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
The most important personal motivation is the
demonstration of concern for others........................................................... 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
Some of my greatest joy comes from making other people happy..............1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
You can tell a lot about someone by noticing
how they treat other people.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

People are often impressed by how considerate I am.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

The best people are those who would take
risks on the behalf of others.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

Those with a humanitarian nature compose the
foundation of society’s greatest achievements.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5

It feels good to compliment people whenever I can.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5

I often find that, when I am shopping for myself, I often think
about buying something for someone else that I know.

1....... 2...... 3......A .....5

People really appreciate it when I show them that I really care.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4.....5

MS/KC
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Appendix E6
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

Those who put in the most effort reap the greatest benefits........................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4...... 5
People are impressed by how hard I work.................................................. 1...... 2...... 3......4.......5
It feels good to put a lot of effort into a project...........................................1...... 2...... 3...... 4...... 5
Hard work and perseverance will pay off in the future............................... 1...... 2...... 3...... 4...... 5
Demonstrating my perseverance to succeed often
leads others to have a better opinion of me................................................. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4...... 5
Hard working people compose the foundation of
society’s greatest achievements.................................................................. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
If two employees with similar achievements were
up for the same promotion, the employee that works
the hardest should be the one to get it.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5

Achievement feels much more rewarding when
you work hard for it.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5

Noting how hard one works can more accurately
assess one’s true nature.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5

It is very satisfying to be motivated to succeed.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5

MS/HW
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Appendix F
Items Relating to Types of Coalitions
Appendix F 1. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my same-sex
friendships.”
Appendix F2. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value the clubs and
organizations in which I am involved.”
Appendix F3. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my ethnic heritage.”
Appendix F4. Items corresponding to the statement “I value my family.”
Appendix F5. Items corresponding to the statement: “I value being a citizen of the
United States.”
Appendix F 6 . Items corresponding to the statement: “I value my religious group.”
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Appendix F 1
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree , 2 = disagree , 3 = neither, 4
= agree , and 5= strongly agree .

You can always count on your best friend.

1...... 2......3.......4..... 5

I find that I don’t have as much fun when my
good friends aren’t around.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

In a good friendship, you often let things slide by
that might otherwise be a problem............................................................ 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
My friends and I look out for each other’s best interests............................ 1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
I have some of the best conversations with my friends...............................1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5
When I am with a friend or friends, I feel
very comfortable and secure.

1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5

I can entrust my friends with personal secrets.

1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5

My friends and I have many of the same interests.

1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5

My good friends accept me for who I am.

1....... 2..... 3....... 4..... 5

My good friends are eager to hear my problems and
to help out the best that they can.

1

....... 2 ..... 3 ....... 4 ..... 5

C/SSF
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Appendix F2
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

I like it that most of the people in the clubs and organizations in
which I am involved are in some way similar to me...................................1......2...... 3.......4.......5
It feels good when I make a contribution to my club or
organization that positively affects the whole group...................................1.......2...... 3...... 4......5
You can tell a lot about a person by assessing their
involvement in extracurricular organizations..............................................1.......2...... 3...... 4......5
Being involved in my clubs and organizations makes me
feel like I have a bond with a group of other people................................... 1.......2...... 3...... 4......5
Some of the most motivated people are those who choose to put
in the effort to be involved with others to accomplish some goal.

1.......2........3...... 4......5

I feel much more complete when I can participate in an
activity with a group of like-minded people.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

My involvement in clubs and organizations is a great way to gain
solid experience in order to prepare me for the working world.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

Being involved in my clubs and organizations makes me feel
that my interests are good interests.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I often feel that I can best relate to people in clubs
and organizations to which I belong.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I am proud of my clubs and organizations.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

C/CO
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Appendix F3
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

I am proud of my ethnic heritage................................................................1....... 2...... 3...... 4......5
I often feel that I can best relate to people
of my ethnic background............................................................................1...... .2...... 3...... 4..... 5
Being with people of the same ancestry or race as me makes
me feel like I have a bond with a group of other people............................. 1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
It feels good when I make a contribution that positively
affects people in my ethnic group...............................................................1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5
I like it that many people of my ancestral heritage
have interests that are similar to mine.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I feel special when I am involved in activities or
customs that are specific to my ethnic heritage.

1.......2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I enjoy recognizing events or holidays that are
specific to my ancestry or race.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I feel that I have a bond with people of my ethnic heritage,
even though I may not know who they are.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

Researching and finding out more information about my
ancestry makes me feel good about myself.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

I feel proud when someone of my race or ancestral
background achieves great things.

1....... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

C/EH
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Appendix F4
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

You can always count on your family........................................................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
Being around my family makes me feel very good.....................................1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
My family accepts me for who I am.......................................................... 1...... 2...... 3...... 4.......5
I feel a strong bond with people in my family............................................ 1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5
People in my family really care about me and my interests.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4......5

I enjoy those times when many of the people in my family
get together to meet in the same place.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

People in my family are eager to hear my problems
and to help out the best that they can.

1...... 2.......3...... 4..... 5

In my family are some of the only people
who really know who I am.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

One’s family contains the only people that someone can
really expect to always be there in times of need.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

My family is composed of a group of people
who really want me in their lives.

1...... 2...... 3...... 4..... 5

C/F
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Appendix F5
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

The United States offers someone more opportunities
than any other country................................................................................ 1......2...... 3.......4......5
I feel a common bond with other U.S. citizens............................................1......2...... 3.......4......5
I really value the freedom that living in the U.S. offers me.........................1......2...... 3.......4......5
Anyone in this country can choose to be whatever they want to be.............1......2...... 3.......4......5
I cannot see myself living anywhere else but in the United States...............1......2...... 3.......4......5
I am proud to live in the United States.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

This country, in general, is a positive role
model for other countries.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

The U.S. is the best country on earth.

1

I enjoy the way of life here in the United States.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

I feel that the U.S. does and has the potential to do
great things for the world at large.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

......2...... 3.......4..... 5

C/US
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Appendix F6
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree , 2 = disagree , 3 = neither, 4
= agree , and 5= strongly agree.

Practicing my religion makes me feel good
about myself and life in general..................................................................1.......2...... 3......4......5
I feel that I have a common bond with many of
the people who practice my religion........................................................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
I often feel compelled to contribute to my religious group
because of all it has provided for me.......................................................... 1......2...... 3.......4......5
My religious group makes me feel secure...................................................1...... 2...... 3.......4......5
Being a part of a religious group entails more than attending
an occasion meeting or time of worship......................................................1...... 2...... 3.......4......5
My religion offers me enough satisfaction that I
sometimes feel compelled to tell other people
(who are not part of my religion) about it.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

I enjoy getting together with others of my faith
to discuss and practice my religion.

1...... 2......3.......4..... 5

I feel as if my religious group cares about my welfare.

1...... 2......3.......4..... 5

If more people practiced my religion, the
world would be a better place.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Truly religious people should have an active role
in their church or religious group.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

C/R
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Appendix G
Filler Items
Please read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or disagree with it.
Please circle one number for each item, where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4
= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

It is best for a college to offer as many majors as is possible...................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
I enjoy eating a variety of foods................................................................. 1.......2...... 3......4......5
It should be up to the students to dictate the time at
which classes should be held...................................................................... 1.......2...... 3......4......5
I generally enjoy the weather more when the
temperature is higher.

1...... 2...... 3.......4......5

Sometimes I like to walk to places to which I
would usually drive.

1......2...... 3.......4......5

When new cars are marketed for sale, one should be able
to choose from a variety of colors.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Making classrooms more comfortable for students should
be a college’s top priority.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

I enjoy the way that coffee tastes.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

Wood furniture is better than furniture made
out of other materials.

1......2...... 3.......4..... 5

When I study, I like to be in a really brightly-lit room.

1...... 2...... 3.......4..... 5

F
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Appendix H
During this part o f the study, you will interact with a participant (Participant C) by
talking into a microphone. The purpose of this interaction is to provide Participant C with
more information about you so that Participant C will be able to decide with whom to
participate in the second half of the experiment.
In order to accomplish this, please choose one of the following topics and talk about it for
about five minutes. If you run out of things to say about the topic that you chose, switch
to a new topic and continue talking. It may be helpful to pretend that you are interacting
face-to-face with another person. Inform the experimenter when you are ready to begin
and please speak clearly once you start. The researcher will tell you when your time is up.

1. What are your favorite and least-favorite classes this semester, and why?

2. Have you decided what your major will be? If so, why? If not, what are you
considering?

3. What qualities in other people do you appreciate and what qualities do you find
annoying?

4. What features do you most like and dislike about your mother and father?
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Appendix I
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (1965)
1. I feel that I am a person o f worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
2. I feel like a person who has a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel like a failure.
4. I feel as if I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel as if I do not have much to be proud of.
6

. I take a positive attitude towards myself.

7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8

. I wish that I could have more respect for myself.

9. i certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
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Appendix J
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al.. 1996)
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a
different opinion.
3. I spend a lot o f time wondering about what kind of person I really am.
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not sure what I was
really like.
6

. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality.

7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.
8

. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.

9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being
different from one day to another day.
10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I would tell someone what I'm really like.
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don't really know
what I want.
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